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ABSTRACT 
 
Presidential-Bureaucratic Management and Policy Making Success in Congress. 
(December 2008) 
José D. Villalobos, B.A., The University of Texas at San Antonio 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. George C. Edwards III 
 
 Presidential policy making in Congress is a lengthy, difficult process that 
involves developing a policy initiative, proposing it to Congress, and winning the 
legislature’s support.  Recent empirical findings indicate that, although centralizing the 
policy making process eases a president’s managerial burdens, it may also decrease the 
likelihood of presidential policy success in Congress.  Alternatively, decentralizing the 
process increases the likelihood of policy success, but constrains the president’s 
discretion over policy substance and incurs greater administrative burdens in the form of 
managing differing viewpoints, contradictory interests, and increased information flow.  
Such findings present an intriguing puzzle: how can presidents balance their managerial 
and information needs and costs to maximize their policy success in Congress?  Solving 
this presidential dilemma can have substantial payoffs for the White House. 
I argue that agency input provides presidents with a degree of bureaucratic 
expertise and objectivity, process transparency, and agency support, which imbues 
presidential proposals with bureaucratic legitimacy and aids their passage into law.  To 
test my hypotheses, I conduct a series of empirical analyses of pooled cross-sectional 
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logistic regression models using a dataset on presidential legislative proposals over the 
period of 1949-2007.  I find that agency input and presidential signaling are key 
components to increased presidential policy success in Congress.  I also find that the 
employment of agency input for policy development decreases the number of changes 
made to the substance of a presidential initiative from its proposal stage to its passage 
into law. 
Because the substance of a proposal matters, sending a stronger signal for a 
proposal developed with agency input should have a stronger, positive influence on 
legislative success.  To explore this possibility, I also incorporate the role that 
voluminous presidential signaling plays at high levels of agency input and find that it has 
a particularly potent, positive influence on legislative success and on lowering the extent 
of change to policy substance in the Senate. 
In light of these findings, I prescribe a new policy making strategy with agency 
input at its core.  My conclusions should also provide an impetus for scholars to 
reconsider conventional wisdom regarding presidential-bureaucratic management and 
legislative policy making. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION - PRESIDENTIAL POLICY MAKING LEADERSHIP IN THE 
LEGISLATIVE ARENA 
 Scholars of the presidency have long devoted considerable attention to the 
president’s leadership of the policy making process in the legislative arena (Neustadt 
1955, 1960, 1990; Edwards 1980, 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Canes-Wrone and de 
Marchi 2002).  These studies assert that the president’s ability to move legislation 
through Congress is an important measure of presidential success.  Scholars argue that 
the conditions under which the president can succeed or fail are linked to the political 
environment inherited by presidents and their ability to bargain with members of 
Congress over policy initiatives (see Edwards 1989, 2003; Bond and Fleisher 1990).  
Due to the Constitution’s division of power, presidents must deal with Congress in the 
legislative process because they need legislative cooperation to enact their policy goals.  
Accordingly, presidents face a significant challenge as they attempt to convince 
legislators to pass their policy proposals into law. 
When presidents take the lead in the policy making process, they hold the 
potential to influence three stages: policy development, agenda setting (i.e. the policy 
proposal stage), and the legislative outcome stage.  Although scholars have considered 
the success of presidential policy initiatives at the agenda setting and legislative outcome 
stages and have examined the factors that determine legislative outcomes, they have 
 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Journal of Political Science. 
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given very little attention to the policy development stage and its factors that may also 
influence presidential policy success in Congress.  Specifically, scholars have dedicated 
relatively very little work to explaining what kind of presidential policy initiatives are 
more likely to succeed in Congress and what factors of the executive branch may lead 
presidents to develop such initiatives. 
Understanding this issue is important because the ability for presidents to achieve 
their policy goals largely depends on their ability to convince Congress to enact them.  
This is the nature of policy making in our system of separation of powers, and exploring 
presidential influence in leading the Congress is important for understanding the 
dynamics of presidential policy making and assessing presidential policy performance. 
Presidential Leadership of Congress 
The literature on presidential leadership of Congress indicates that presidents are 
limited in their ability to lead in the legislative arena.  Richard Neustadt’s renowned 
work, Presidential Power (1960, 1990), portrays the president as an inherently weak 
actor.  He asserts that presidents are constrained by the nature of “separated institutions 
sharing powers,” which denies them the ability to lead legislators through command 
(Neustadt 1990, 29).  He argues that presidents must rely on their reputation, prestige, 
and skill to successfully persuade members of Congress to act on his accord.  His main 
argument—that presidential power is the power to persuade—rests partly on the notion 
that presidents depend on legislative support for enacting their policy initiatives. 
In response to Neustadt’s work, presidential scholars have looked for ways to 
better assess and understand the president’s leadership of Congress.  Specifically, 
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scholars have looked at the factors that affect presidential policy success in the 
legislative arena (Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990).  They cite many of these 
factors as constraints derived from the separation of powers, such as the bicameral 
structure of Congress, veto power, and agenda setting procedures (see Krehbiel 1998; 
Cameron 2000; Edwards and Barrett 2000).  Scholars also find that factors related to the 
ideological makeup and majority control of Congress are particularly influential in 
determining presidential policy success or failure (see Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 
1990; Conley 2003).  Last, scholars find that public approval of the president also plays 
a role in determining whether legislators are likely to support a president’s policy 
initiative and that presidents are more likely to succeed when they adopt policy 
initiatives that the public supports (see Edwards 1989, 2003; Canes-Wrone 2001, 2006).  
Presidency scholars have considered the factors that influence presidential 
leadership of Congress at the agenda setting proposal stage and the legislative outcome 
stage.  Regarding the agenda setting stage, scholars find that presidents play an 
important role in influencing the legislative agenda, but also that they are limited in their 
ability to influence whether an initiative will pass into law.  Edwards and Barrett (2000, 
120) find that, although 97.6 percent of all presidential initiatives succeeded in obtaining 
agenda status from 1935 to 1996, a majority were ultimately defeated. 
Such findings have led scholars to research whether presidents can be strategic in 
the manner in which they propose their initiatives.  Since legislators decide final roll call 
vote outcomes, presidents must take into consideration what the Congress wants when 
considering policy options (see Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990, 2000; Conley 
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2003).  In addition to the manner that presidents propose their initiatives, they may also 
work to build coalitions, perhaps by courting cross-over members in the legislature (see 
Edwards 1989). 
Edwards (1989) argues that leadership through coalition building helps the 
president function as a “facilitator” of change, “influencing a few critical actors and 
taking advantage of the opportunities for change already present in his environment” 
(Edwards 1989, 5).  He demonstrates how member predispositions and party loyalties 
determine roll call outcomes, leaving presidential influence largely limited to the cross-
pressured, centrist members of Congress on close vote counts (see also Bond and 
Fleisher 1990).   
Scholars find that another important factor determining presidential policy 
success in Congress is whether the president attempts to influence legislative behavior 
by going to the public for legislative support.  Early on, Richard Neustadt (1960, 1990) 
recognized that a president’s standing with the public is a key factor in his ability to 
persuade the Congress to act in accordance with his policy preferences.  Indeed, many 
scholars argue that attaining public support endows presidents with a “political 
resource,” a degree of justification for pursuing the presidential agenda in Congress, 
achieving reelection, and leaving behind a favorable legacy (Brody 1991, 3; Cornwell 
1965; Neustadt 1990; Ostrom and Simon 1985).  Scholars point out that policy 
initiatives are more likely to pass into law if popular (Canes-Wrone 2001, 2006; 
Edwards 1989, 2003) and that public support is particularly crucial when a president 
lacks cohesive majorities in Congress (Edwards 1989; see also Bond and Fleisher 1990). 
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In recent years, scholars have found that contemporary presidents are particularly 
predisposed to lead the public by engaging in a permanent campaign, a practice that 
amounts to a strategy of governing by campaigning, otherwise known as the “going 
public” model.1  The going public model is, at its core, an attempt to intimidate 
congressional opponents with their own constituencies.  Because the aim of going public 
is to defeat opposition in a zero-sum game, it discourages presidents from seeking to 
build coalitions across party and ideological lines (Edwards 2006, 287).  Pointing out 
that presidents have a low likelihood for success in going public, however, Edwards 
(2003, 246) concludes that presidents “should not base their strategies for governing on 
the premise of substantially increasing the size of their public support.” 
New Focus on the Policy Development Stage 
Scholars of the presidency have learned much about the influence presidents 
have in proposing their policy initiatives to Congress and on when they are most likely 
to succeed in getting their policy initiatives passed into law.  What remains is for 
scholars to develop a clearer understanding of the process of policy development that 
occurs prior to the proposal of presidential policy initiatives and how that development 
process can affect the likelihood of presidential legislative success.  Indeed, how 
presidents choose to develop their policy initiatives and present their proposals to 
Congress may have important implications regarding the legislative outcome of a policy 
initiative.   
                                                 
1
 The development of the “going public” model (Kernell 1997) is in concert with studies on the 
“permanent campaign” (Ornstein and Mann 2000), and the practice of “governing by campaigning” 
(Edwards 2006).  Accordingly, I use these terms interchangeably. 
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In their managerial role, presidents may look to White House staffers or the vast 
resource of executive agencies for assistance to help develop their policy proposals.  
Carrying out this process requires presidents to collect, organize, and sort out 
information because, as Neustadt (1990, 128-9) puts it, “a president is helped by what he 
gets into his mind.  His first essential need is information.”  Specifically, presidents have 
at their disposal two primary resources for policy making: the “responsive competence” 
of White House personnel and the expertise of agency civil servants (see Heclo 1999; 
Moe 1985; Rourke 1992; Rudalevige 2002; Wolf 1999).  To manage the process, 
presidents may centralize policy development within the Executive Office, delegate its 
formation to the wider bureaucracy (i.e. decentralize), or employ a combination of the 
two (Rudalevige 2002, 29).2 
When presidents seek information for policy development, they may experience 
a measure of friction, which scholars commonly refer to as a “transaction cost” (Coase 
1937, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; North 1990; Williamson 1979, 1996, 1998; 
Williamson and Masten 1995; see also Hall and Taylor 1996, 951; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1994, 1999).  In particular, friction may occur when presidents, in seeking 
information to develop their policy proposals, encounter opposite viewpoints and 
contradictory interests from the input of their executive branch staff. 
To minimize transaction costs, presidents seek the cheapest source of trusted 
information that will get them from policy proposal to legislative passage (Rudalevige 
                                                 
2
 In doing so, presidents make institutional choices comparable to a firm’s decision to “make” (i.e. 
centralize) or “buy” (i.e. decentralize) (see Coase 1937, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Williamson 
1979, 1996, 1998). 
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2002).  In doing so, presidents often seek to maximize the value of a proposal in terms of 
their personal policy preferences.  Faced with the option of centralizing policy proposal 
development within the White House staff or delegating its development to executive 
agency actors, presidents prefer to centralize the process whenever possible because it 
lowers the front-end managerial transaction costs of policy development and maximizes 
their personal preferences (see Moe 1985; Moe and Wilson 1994; Nathan 1983). 
Previous scholarship identifies a general preference among presidents for 
centralization amid the growth of the executive branch (Burke 2000; Moe 1985; 
Ragsdale and Theis 1997; Walcott and Hult 1995, 2005).  However, such works are 
dominated by case studies that are not systemically generalizable and not quantitative.  
More recently, Rudalevige (2002) provides the first quantitative analysis of a 
representative sample of cases that identifies when presidents are most likely to 
centralize, the implications and risks of centralization, and the trade-offs between 
presidential management of the policy development stage and policy success in 
Congress.  He finds that centralized policy making decreases the likelihood of 
presidential policy success in Congress (see Rudalevige 2002). 
Although much of the previous scholarship on centralization presumes that 
presidents prefer to centralize the policy making process (Moe 1985; Moe and Wilson 
1994; Nathan 1983), Rudalevige (2002) finds little evidence that centralization 
dominates presidential policy making and no evidence of an increase in the overall level 
of centralization over time.  Moreover, he finds that, although centralizing the policy 
making process eases a president’s managerial burdens by reducing the amount of input 
   8    
 
 
to a small circle of White House staff (Burke 2000; Heclo 1999; Moe 1985; Ragsdale 
and Theis 1997; Walcott and Hult 1995, 2005), it can also result in greater levels of 
congressional opposition that impedes legislative success (see Rudalevige 2002). 
The problem with centralizing policy development is that, in doing so, presidents 
often disregard the potential adverse affect that such strategy may have on the likelihood 
of proposal passage (Rudalevige 2002).  Indeed, presidents may not realize the pitfalls of 
centralization for policy making in much the way they misperceive the strategy of 
“going public” as a formidable means to move public opinion (see Edwards 2003).  
Presidents may also attribute past failures to inexperience or miscommunication and 
continue their efforts to centralize rather than seek a new path.  In this manner, 
“ignorance combines with arrogance” so that presidents stubbornly continue their 
attempts to centralize despite a lower likelihood of legislative success (Rudalevige 2002, 
156; Neustadt 1990, Ch. 11). 
Alternatively, decentralizing the process may increase the likelihood of policy 
success, but constrains the president’s discretion over policy substance and incurs higher 
costs in the form of competing viewpoints and conflicting objectives between staff 
members, and an overall larger amount of informational input (i.e. advice) that the 
president must consider (Rudalevige 2002).  Thus, despite his assessment that presidents 
“might be better off decentralizing policy more generally,” Rudalevige (2002, 150-1) 
maintains that, “the burdens of management are often sufficient incentive to shift the 
process the other way.” 
Although Rudalevige (2002) examines the general effects of decentralization, he 
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does not extend his study to formulate a theoretical argument of the role and value of 
agency input for influencing the likelihood of policy success in Congress.  Indeed, 
almost no research tests empirically the merits of decentralized policy making or any 
other alternative strategies for increasing policy success in Congress.  Instead, 
Rudalevige and others discount the potential of agency input on presidential policy 
making as a costly, inefficient information resource (Moe 1985; Moe and Wilson 1994; 
Nathan 1983; but see Heclo 1999; Wolf 1999).  To help fill this gap in the literature, I 
address the development phase of the policy making process by considering how 
presidents can best manage and develop their policy initiatives in order to maximize 
their ability to succeed in the legislative arena. 
Summary 
A major challenge that presidents face is persuading legislators to pass their 
policy proposals into law.  Because the Constitution bounds presidents to share their 
power with the legislative branch, presidents depend heavily on Congress to enact their 
policy goals.  Currently, most of the literature considers the second and third stages of 
the policy making process— agenda setting (i.e. the policy proposal stage) and 
legislative outcomes.  Unfortunately, scholars have paid very little attention to the first 
phase—the development stage of a policy initiative.  As a result, scholars are missing a 
key piece of the puzzle that explains why, when, and how presidents are more likely to 
succeed in achieving their policy goals by passing their initiatives through the Congress.  
In the next chapter, I formulate a theoretical argument for the role and value of agency 
input in more decentralized presidential legislative policy making. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Presiding at the helm of a complex structural hierarchy that begins at the Oval 
Office and winds its way down through the numerous agencies in the executive branch, 
presidents have at their disposal vast resources of information for leading the policy 
making process.  Due to the constitutional constraint of the separation of powers, the 
main obstacle that presidents face in policy making is that they must convince legislators 
to pass their policy proposals into law.  In developing their policy initiatives, presidents 
regularly seek the advice of executive branch staff.  The kind of advice presidents seek 
and who they seek it from may greatly influence whether legislators will perceive a 
given policy proposal as a viable policy solution. 
Although scholars have considered how presidents can influence the policy 
making process at the proposal and legislative outcome stages and have identified 
important factors that affect presidential policy making performance, there has been 
relatively little research regarding the development stage of the process.  To fill this gap 
in the literature, I formulate a new theoretical framework on the role and value that 
agency input may have in influencing presidential policy making success in Congress. 
I posit that agency input affords presidential policy development agency 
expertise and objectivity, process transparency and cooperative consultation with 
Congress, and agency support, which should markedly increase presidential policy 
making success in Congress.  The involvement of agency actors in the policy 
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development phase provides presidents with a degree of bureaucratic expertise3 that is 
more objective than the advice of the president’s inner circle and which legislators—
particularly partisan opponents of the president—are therefore less likely to oppose.  
Agency actors are more objective than White House staffers because they are less likely 
to view policy options primarily through an ideological lens and instead base much of 
their preferences on bureaucratic expertise grounded in years of policy learning and 
institutional memory, which provides them with an authoritative knowledge of 
government procedures and folkways (Weko 1995; Wolf 1999).   
Agency involvement at the policy development stage also allows members of 
Congress to more openly observe and take part in the policy making process, which 
helps to legitimize a policy initiative in the eyes of legislators prior to its proposal.   
Indeed, according to Rudalevige (2002, 150), “members of Congress know less about an 
item being crafted in the White House than they do about a departmental production, and 
have less reason to believe that the information they do receive from EOP sources is 
reliable.”  Given that congressional committees often hold hearings to ascertain whether 
a policy initiative represents a valid policy solution, presidential policy proposals with 
agency support are therefore less likely to generate skepticism among legislators.  
Consequently, by attaining the input of agency actors, the president thus signals to 
members of Congress that a given policy proposal has endured the scrutiny and earned 
the support of the very people responsible for its eventual implementation. 
                                                 
3
 Friedrich (1940) defines bureaucratic expertise as advice that consists largely of technical knowledge 
regarding a certain public policy sphere (see also Long 1952; Lipsky 1980; Gruber 1987; Balla 1998; 
Balla and Wright 2001; Meier and O’Toole 2006). 
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Agency Input as a Policy Making Tool 
The potential utility of agency input to the president as a policy making tool 
depends partly on whether it can effectively increase presidential policy success in 
Congress.  Specifically, employing agency input during the policy development phase is 
of greater benefit to the president if it markedly decreases the subsequent costs of 
moving a proposal through Congress and thus increases its overall likelihood of passage 
into law.  Initial empirical testing by Rudalevige (2002) indicates that decentralized 
proposal development involving the wider executive bureaucracy is generally more 
likely to succeed than centralized development occurring exclusively within the 
Executive Office of the President.  Such findings provide an impetus for formulating a 
theoretical argument on the role and value of agency input for presidential policy 
development and for exploring the extent to which agency input may increase the 
likelihood of presidential policy success in Congress. 
Some scholars argue that presidents can more effectively develop policy 
proposals that satisfy their personal preferences by seeking the “responsive competence” 
of their loyal inner circle of advisers rather than seeking the advice of agency actors 
(Moe 1985, 1989; Moe and Wilson 1994; Nathan 1983).  In particular, Moe (1985) 
argues that agency bureaucrats have their own personal preferences tied to the mission of 
the agencies they serve and thus lack incentive to be responsive to the president’s policy 
preferences (Moe 1985, 1989; Moe and Wilson 1994; Nathan 1983). 
Instead, Moe (1989, 280) posits that, “most all agencies impinge in one way or 
another on larger presidential responsibilities—for the budget, for the economy, for 
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national defense—and presidents must have the capacity to direct and constrain agency 
behavior in basic respects if these larger responsibilities are to be handled successfully.”  
In other words, Moe (1985, 1989) suggests that presidents are better off seeking control 
over bureaucratic processes and outcomes by centralizing (as well as politicizing) the 
policy making process whenever possible.  Concerning presidential policy development, 
Moe (1985, 1989) contends that the employment of centralized EOP staff is more likely 
to provide the kind of responsiveness to policy preferences that presidents need in 
preparing their policy initiatives for proposal to Congress. 
Challenging Moe’s (1985) main premise, Wolf (1999) conducts a thorough 
examination of the history of the Bureau of Budget (BoB) and finds that the BoB was 
remarkably responsive to Roosevelt and Truman’s administrative and policy needs.  
Wolf (1999, 143) further finds that both presidents regularly sought the advice of BoB 
agency staff “not out of necessity but as a matter of choice because the agency was 
highly responsive to their needs.”  He concludes that the BoB’s high level of 
responsiveness is largely a product of its mission and institutional status as a budgetary 
agency, which are closely linked to presidential needs in a way that does not diminish 
the agency’s objectivity and expertise (Wolf 1999, 158). 
Rourke (1981, 219) similarly finds that bureaucratic challenges to presidential 
authority in the policy making process are rare and that civil servants tend to view and 
respect the president as a representative of the public.  Although there is evidence that 
bureaucrats do sometimes show resistance to certain presidential policy initiatives, they 
are more often inclined aid presidents in seeking their policy goals (Campbell and Naulls 
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1991, 85-118; see also Edwards 2001).  Indeed, Wilson (1989, 275) points out that, 
“what is surprising is not that bureaucrats sometimes can defy the president but that they 
support his programs as much as they do.”  Concerning the eventual implementation of 
presidential policy initiatives, many scholars (including Moe) have found ample 
evidence that bureaucracies tend to follow the president’s policy implementation plans 
(see Moe 1982; Ringquist 1995; Golden 2000). 
Campbell (1986, 19) argues that presidents can employ agency input to achieve 
“policy competence” while maintaining their ability to manage the executive branch 
without forfeiting staff responsiveness.  He and others assert that a trade-off between 
“neutral” (i.e. objective) and “responsive” competence is not necessary so long as 
presidents do not lose sight of their institutional interests in pursuit of their partisan 
political ones (see Campbell 1986, 161-5; Wolf 1999; Weko 1995; Heclo 1975).  
Specifically, by seeking policy competent solutions to aid their political goals, presidents 
can create powerful organizational incentives for agency actors to be responsive to their 
needs while also providing politically satisfying and bureaucratically effective policy 
advice (Wolf 1999; see also Wilson 1989, 275).4 
Other studies find that centralized advice may hinder the president’s policy 
making success in Congress because legislators may view such advice as more partisan 
than the advice of agency actors (Rudalevige 2002; see also Heclo 1975; Seidman 1998, 
156-7).  Because White House staff members are primarily loyal to the president’s 
policy preferences, legislators often view highly centralized policy proposals as highly 
                                                 
4
 Similar studies find that whenever politicians heed the advice of agency actors, the result is effective and 
representative policymaking (Gruber 1987; Meier and O’Toole 2006). 
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politicized ones (indeed, they often can be), which makes partisan opposition (and 
support) to a given proposal more likely (see Heclo 1975; Dickinson 1997; Rudalevige 
2002).  Partisan opposition can be detrimental to a president’s ability to pass policy 
proposals into law, particularly for presidents who govern under conditions of divided 
government.5   
Presidential policy making success also depends on the president’s ability to 
acquire reliable information concerning the likely policy outcomes of their initiatives.  
Dickinson (1997, 104-5) finds that a lack of substantive expertise among White House 
staffers can lead to misleading policy advice, which may result in failed policy making 
attempts or impractical policy solutions that undermine the president’s policy and 
administrative goals (see also Campbell 1986; Light 1995; Wolf 1999).  Legislators are 
aware that highly centralized policy initiatives may be unreliable, or at least less reliable, 
compared with those that benefit from bureaucratic expertise, and are thus less likely to 
support their passage (see Rudalevige 2002). 
To help overcome partisan opposition in Congress and to compensate for the lack 
of expertise and bureaucratic legitimacy of White House staff, presidents may employ 
alternative informational resources to help convince legislators that a policy proposal 
merits their approval.  Outside of their inner circle of advisors, presidents have at their 
disposal the vast informational resources of executive branch agencies, which can 
                                                 
5
 Presidents are also likely to face some measure of opposition in Congress under conditions of unified 
government and, in some cases, may also face opposition from their own party members if their proposals 
follow a new or different path that contradicts past party preferences.  Even when presidents enjoy a 
majority in the Senate, for example, they often need a number of opposition party members to cross over 
in support of a bill in order to achieve the passage of their policy initiatives (see Brady and Volden 2006; 
see also Jones 2005; Fisher 1998). 
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provide advice that is more objective and grounded in years of policy learning and 
institutional memory (Weko 1995; Wolf 1999).  Scholars posit that bureaucratic 
objectivity and expertise endows agency actors with an authoritative knowledge of 
government procedures and folkways, which elected officials can employ to gain “useful 
and disinterested advice in designing national policy” (Rourke 1992, 539; see also Weko 
1995; West 2004, 2005; Wolf 1999). 
When presidents seek agency input for developing policy initiatives, their 
proposals benefit from an informational advantage that agency actors hold over 
legislators (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; West 1999; see also Cameron and Park 2006).  
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) argue that because legislators lack the knowledge and 
experience required to solve a difficult policy problem marked by a high level of 
uncertainty, they are likely to defer the authority to an agency to implement a more 
nuanced policy solution, perhaps with a range of possible outcomes despite their 
preference for a particular alternative (see also Fiorina 1986).  Scholars find that 
legislators themselves are open to delegating authority to bureaucrats to develop policies 
that require a high level of expertise, particularly when trying to avoid taking 
responsibility for difficult policy decisions that are complex, unpopular, or when 
Congress lacks a clear-cut majority for a particular alternative (see Fiorina 1982; 
McCubbins 1985; Arnold 1990).   
Agency input also adds a measure of transparency that encourages members of 
Congress to view a proposal as a legitimate policy solution.  Unlike the development of 
centralized policy initiatives among the president’s inner circle that occurs primarily 
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behind closed doors within the Executive Office, decentralized policy development 
employing agency input allows a more open dialogue between the president and agency 
actors, which legislators are able to follow and observe.  According to Rudalevige (2002, 
150), “members of Congress know less about an item being crafted in the White House 
than they do about a departmental production, and have less reason to believe that the 
information they do receive from EOP sources is reliable.”  By choosing a more 
transparent route for developing a policy proposal, presidents are thus less likely to raise 
suspicions among legislators about the circumstances surrounding the development of 
their policy proposals. 
The inclusion of agencies in the policy development phase also encourages 
consultative networking and cooperation between the president, Congress, and 
bureaucratic actors (see Rudalevige 2002, 116-8).  Consultative networking allows 
presidents to better assess the political landscape, gather intelligence, and act on the 
feedback, particularly from key legislators serving on legislative committees 
(Rudalevige 2002, 117).  Consultation also provides legislators an opportunity to voice 
their concerns about an initiative during its development and, in response, leads agency 
actors to help the president develop sound policy solutions to such concerns.  Goodwin 
(1991, 222), for example, documents President Lyndon B. Johnson’s claim that 
consultation proved so helpful to his policy agenda that he advocated it not just during 
the policy development stage, but at “every single stage” of the policy making process 
(see also Peterson 1984, 21-4).  Rudalevige (2002, Ch. 3) similarly finds that a large part 
of FDR’s presidency benefited from open consultation with legislators regarding 
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instances of decentralized policy development, which in turn led to responsive and 
effective bureaucratic implementation of FDR’s policy agenda. 
Despite the fact consultation increases the potential for legislative cooperation 
and agency responsiveness, historical evidence shows that presidents generally do not 
consult with members of Congress (Peterson 1984, 1990).  As Rudalevige (2002, 156) 
points out, “consultative connections are poorly developed between the White House 
and the committees that shape congressional consideration, in sharp contrast to the 
networks that link the legislature and bureaucracy.  Further, centralized staffers (with the 
president’s political needs firmly in mind) often give short shrift to the competing 
incentives facing legislators.  The result is an institutional disconnect.”   
According to Peterson (1984, 1990), presidents do not consult for a number of 
reasons.  Given the fractured and fragmented nature of the legislative branch, presidents 
are generally hesitant to consult with legislators (see Peterson 1990).  Indeed, presidents 
tend to view Congress as “parochial, sievelike, and prone to transforming important 
matters of state into pork-barrel issues” (see Edwards 1989, 201; Peterson 1984, 10).  
Often, presidents have strong policy preferences and avoid consultation because they are 
simply uninterested in finding compromises to satisfy the concerns of legislators who 
oppose them (Peterson 1984, 10).  Other times, presidents are simply unable to consult 
because of time constraints regarding policy proposal deadlines and the limited amount 
of time that administration officials have to deal with the total number of presidential 
proposals submitted to Congress (see Edwards 1989, 201). 
When presidents do consult with Congress, scholars find that it has traditionally 
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played a “considerably less prominent role in presidential-congressional relations” than 
one might expect (Edwards 1989, 199).  For instance, presidents may use consultation as 
merely a public relations effort in which presidents and their staff ceremonially listen to 
the advice of opposition party legislators only to completely disregard it (see Peterson 
1984, 13; Edwards 1989, 199-200).  Presidents may also consult primarily for tactical 
reasons to obtain the legislative votes necessary for passage, rather than to have full, 
open cooperation with the legislative branch (see Edwards 1989, 186-7).  Although 
legislators are sure to prefer full cooperation over symbolic or tactical approaches to 
consultation, they are nevertheless likely to view any form of consultation in a relatively 
more positive light than having no consultation at all. 
Despite the evidence that presidents have been adverse to legislative 
consultation, the general lack of consultation “does not in itself constitute a compelling 
argument that [presidents] should not do so to increase their legislative support” 
(Edwards 1989, 200).  In other words, because modern presidents have mostly avoided 
consultative approaches, it is difficult to know the full potential of consultation beyond 
the relatively modest evidence we do have, which indicates that it can help improve 
presidential-legislative relations.   Peterson (1984, 21-4) himself points out that 
presidents are well-advised to consult with members of Congress because it helps to 
create an atmosphere of consensus rather than one of polarization and 
miscommunication.  As Edwards (1989, 199) puts it, “observers often consider 
[consultation] crucial to good relations with Congress, and failure to consult is taken as a 
sign of a lack of leadership skill.” 
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Although presidents may not incorporate all the feedback they receive from 
legislators, consultation nevertheless provides legislators with a participatory role that 
allows for more open communication between the branches and reduces the likelihood 
of congressional opposition and gridlock during the proposal phase (see Rudalevige 
2002, 117; Peterson 1990, 51; Goodwin 1991, 222).  Because the use of agency input 
affords presidents the opportunity to consult with legislators in a way that centralized 
policy making does not, I posit that the inclusion of agency input in the policy 
development phase will encourage better presidential-congressional relations, which in 
turn will benefit presidential policy making efforts in Congress.6 
Although not all policy initiatives require policy expertise for their development 
or passage through Congress, most policy initiatives require the compliance of agency 
bureaucrats for their eventual implementation.  For the president, seeking the input of 
agency actors in developing a policy initiative is important for increasing the likelihood 
that the implementation phase will succeed in accordance with their policy agenda 
objectives.  Otherwise, the exclusion of agencies from the policy making process may 
constrain the president’s ability to implement policy and govern effectively.  
Specifically, presidents (and legislators) cannot be sure that civil servants will be willing 
or able to effectively implement their policy directives if presidents do not consult with 
                                                 
6
 One might also argue that the president can consult with the legislative branch without including agency 
input, but such an approach is likely to work only in cases where the policy preferences of the president 
and the majority of legislators are highly compatible.  By the same token, it is in cases where executive 
and legislative branch policy preferences are least compatible that including agency input (assuming it 
serves the president’s policy agenda) may be most beneficial for helping to achieve the president’s 
policymaking goals. 
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them and gain their support during the policy development phase.7 
For the reasons described above, the inclusion of agency input in the policy 
development phase is useful for convincing legislators—especially partisan opponents—
that a given presidential policy proposal presents a legitimate policy solution that merits 
passage into law.  Specifically, agency input provides presidential policy proposals with 
a degree of bureaucratic expertise that is more objective than the advice of White House 
staff because agency actors are less likely to view policy options primarily through an 
ideological lens and instead base their preferences primarily on bureaucratic expertise 
grounded in years of policy learning and institutional memory (Weko 1995; Wolf 1999).  
Agency input at the policy development stage also allows members of Congress to more 
openly observe the policy making process and signals to members of Congress that a 
given policy proposal has earned the support of the very people responsible for its 
eventual implementation.  Presidential employment of agency input should therefore aid 
presidents in achieving their policy making goals in Congress.  Thus, I hypothesize that 
a president’s use of agency input in the development of a policy proposal increases its 
likelihood of passage in Congress (H1). 
Agency Input Influence on Changes in Policy Substance 
When presidents set out to lead as policy makers, they begin at the policy 
development stage by collecting information and advice from their staff to help turn their 
                                                 
7
 Although agency personnel tend to follow legislative directives regardless of their level of involvement 
in the policy development stage, their exclusion from the development process to circumvent agency 
opposition may damage agency morale and lead to ineffective policy implementation outcomes (Wolf 
1999, 145; see also Heclo 1975; Seidman 1998, 156-7).  In some cases, the exclusion of agency actors has 
even encouraged organizational deviation, resulting in the circumvention of legislative directives by civil 
servants who believe that their implementation would result in failed or negative policy outcomes (see 
O’Leary 1994). 
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general policy preferences and initiative ideas into viable policy solutions.  At this stage 
of policy making, presidents have free reign over the process and can therefore seek 
advice and continue the development process until a policy initiative meets their 
expectations and is ready to be formally proposed to the Congress.  However, presidents 
must be strategic about how they present a proposal to Congress because a proposal that 
meets all their needs may not be seen as acceptable by legislators, particularly partisan 
opponents.  As managers of the executive branch, presidents must therefore make 
important choices as to whom they will delegate the task of policy development and to 
what extent they will give discretion to certain staff over the substance and direction a 
policy proposal takes.   
If presidents seek information from staff wisely, policy development should 
result in a proposal that the president finds satisfactory and that also takes into account 
any potential opposition that legislators may raise.  Otherwise, legislators may seek to 
change or defeat a presidential proposal.  As such, if presidents look to their inner circle 
of loyal staff for their policy develop needs, it is likely that they will produce policy 
proposals that closely mirror their general policy preferences.  However, in centralizing 
the process, presidents risk creating opposition to their proposals if legislators view such 
proposals as partisan or lacking the substance needed to produce effective policy 
outcomes.  In such cases, presidents can lose legislative support for their policy 
proposals due to a general lack (or at least a perceived lack) of bureaucratic legitimacy.  
On the other hand, if presidents seek information from agency actors, they may be better 
able to find a balance between their personal preferences, expert bureaucratic advice, 
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and the expectations of legislators.  Given the expectation that agency input leads to 
increased policy success in Congress, it may be that lower costs incurred during the 
legislative process also decreases the extent of changes in a policy’s substance from 
proposal to passage.   
As previously discussed, because agency involvement at the policy development 
stage allows members of Congress and the public to more openly observe the policy 
making process, it likewise provides opportunities for cooperation that allow for 
deliberation and revision of policy nuances before the president formally proposes a 
policy initiative to Congress (see Rudalevige 2002, 116-8; Peterson 1990, 51; Goodwin 
1991, 222).  Thus, if presidents employ agency input for the development of a policy 
proposal, it is more likely that the expert advice provided during the development phase 
will lead to congressional support during the legislative phase and thus decrease the need 
for changes in the substance of the policy proposal (see Rudalevige 2002, 117).  
Accordingly, I hypothesize that agency input decreases the extent of changes in a policy 
proposal’s substance from the proposal stage to its legislative outcome (H2). 
Signaling with Agency Input 
Just as presidents may employ varying centralization to help develop policy 
initiatives, they may also employ a variety of signaling strategies in proposing their 
policy initiatives.  How and under what conditions presidents propose their policies 
denotes the type of signal they send to Congress.  In a previous study, Esbaugh-Soha 
(2006) finds that when presidents deliver increased (i.e. more voluminous) public signals 
to certain political actors through speeches, they improve their policy making 
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performance (see also Esbaugh-Soha 2008).  Building on Esbaugh-Soha’s (2006) 
general expectation regarding more voluminous signaling, I posit that presidential policy 
initiatives developed with a high level of agency input are likely to provide a clearer, 
more substantive signal to legislators as to why a their policy proposals merit legislative 
passage.   
I expect signaling and agency input to be indirectly related such that an 
interactive effect between substantive agency input and voluminous signaling should 
further increase the overall likelihood of policy success in Congress.  In other words, 
because agency input provides presidents with sound expert advice, and because 
Congress views such advice as more legitimate, then more voluminous signaling of a 
proposal that includes agency input should likewise increase the overall clarity of the 
proposal and thereby further aid its passage into law.  Thus, I hypothesize that more 
voluminous signaling at each level of agency input increases the likelihood of proposal 
passage (H3). 
 Similarly, because agency involvement at the policy development stage provides 
opportunities for cooperation between the president, legislators, and agency actors, it is 
more likely that more voluminous signaling in conjunction with agency input will lower 
the likelihood that legislators will look to significantly alter the substance of a given 
presidential policy initiative once the president formally proposes it.  Thus, if presidents 
employ agency input for the development of a policy proposal, it is more likely that the 
consultation occurring during the development phase has already taken into account the 
preferences and suggestions of legislators (particularly key committee members) and 
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thus decreased the need for further changes in the substance of the policy proposal (see 
Rudalevige 2002, 117).  Thus, I hypothesize that more voluminous signaling at each 
level of agency input decreases the extent of changes in a policy proposal’s substance 
from the proposal stage to its passage (H4). 
New Issues and Issue Complexity 
 Presidents at times address new policy issues for which there exists little or no 
previous institutional knowledge or learning.  In these cases, presidents may find that 
there exists no corresponding bureaucratic entity to address such issues and are thus 
unable to institute agency input for developing policy proposals.  Gathering information 
on how to address new issues is laborious and time consuming because there are likely 
to be multiple ideas and preferences to consider (see Kingdon 1995, Ch. 6).  Without the 
availability of agency input, presidents are more likely to find opposition and skepticism 
among legislators, particularly those of the opposition party.  Because new issues present 
a situation where agency input is less likely, I hypothesize that issue novelty decreases 
the likelihood of proposal passage and increases the amount of changes in policy 
substance from proposal to passage (H5). 
 For issues that are complex in nature, presidents may not have the information 
they need to develop a proposal from within the confines of the White House and are 
thus more likely to seek outside advice from an executive agency.  However, as 
Rudalevige (2002, 129) points out, complex proposals are harder for the president to 
pass through Congress because they are likely to fall into agency and congressional 
committee turf wars.  Because issue complexity is likely to lead to competing sources of 
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bureaucratic advice, I hypothesize that increased issue complexity decreases the 
likelihood of proposal passage and increases the amount of changes in policy substance 
from proposal to passage (H6). 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I introduced my theoretical framework for addressing the role and 
value of agency input in presidential legislative policy making.  Specifically, I argue that 
the involvement of agency actors in the policy development phase provides presidential 
policy initiatives a measure of agency expertise, objectivity, process transparency, 
cooperative consultation with legislators, and agency support that may markedly 
increase presidential policy making success in Congress.  In addition to my core 
theoretical expectations, I also point out a number of factors related to agency input that 
may influence policy outcomes.  Namely, I posit that the use of voluminous signaling at 
each level of agency input will further increase the likelihood of legislative success and 
decrease the likelihood of changes in policy proposal’s substance.  Having outlined my 
theoretical framework, I now move to develop an empirically model for testing my 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In my critical review of the literature on presidential policy making strategies, I 
call into question the assertions made by Moe (1985) and other scholars that centralized 
policy development aids presidential policy making.  Indeed, although some scholars 
have argued that centralized policy development lowers managerial costs and provides 
presidents with a measure of responsive competence, other scholars posit that the 
inclusion of agency input in policy development provides presidents with valuable 
information, which allows them to develop policy competent solutions to aid their 
political goals. 
For the most part, it has been difficult for scholars to determine what kind of 
policy making strategy works best because much of the past literature has been 
dominated by case studies, which lack the kind of systemic quantitative analysis needed 
to draw generalizable conclusions.  Consequently, a dearth of systemic empirical 
evidence in past research has been a major obstacle to developing a broader, more 
definitive understanding of which type of strategy presidents should employ to help 
maximize their policy making efforts in the legislative arena. 
To overcome the limitations of previous studies, I conduct a systematic 
quantitative examination of the relationship between the level of agency input (i.e. 
decentralization) and presidential policy making success in Congress.  More specifically, 
I employ pooled cross-sectional logit regression analyses across eleven presidential 
administrations to determine whether increased agency input increases the likelihood of 
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presidential policy success in Congress.  I contend that presidential policy making 
success in Congress is a function of a president’s utilization of agency input in the 
development of a policy proposal, presidential signaling, the ideological makeup and 
majority control of Congress, presidential popularity, and a number of other control 
variables.  For each of my analyses, I report predicted probability scores to provide 
substantive conclusions about how certain factors influence the likelihood of legislative 
success. 
To control for the differences in the makeup and legislative procedures inherent 
in each legislative body, I use separate models for each chamber in my analyses—one 
for success in the Senate and the other for success in the House of Representatives.  I 
also apply a number of alternative measures for crosscutting jurisdictions, presidential 
support in Congress, House and Senate liberalism, presidential approval, and the 
budgetary situation.  Last, I include administration controls to account for the 
idiosyncratic effects of individual presidents and their administrations. 
Once I determine whether agency input matters for determining presidential 
policy success in Congress, I then move to explore which level of agency input holds the 
most potential for helping presidents to move their policy agendas through the legislative 
arena.  Specifically, I rerun my main analyses for each subgroup of my agency input 
ordinal measure to determine whether the influence of more voluminous signaling 
increases at each level of agency input. 
Data Overview 
To test my hypotheses regarding the influence of agency input on presidential 
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policy making success in Congress, I employ a dataset on presidential legislative 
proposals that covers the years 1949-2007.  The data provide an N of 466 presidential 
initiatives randomly sampled from archival data of the Public Papers of the President 
(PPP), comprising 4,239 messages.8  For each observation, the unit of analysis is the 
presidential initiative proposed within a presidential message.  Each observation serves 
as a starting point for determining the substance and volume of a presidential initiative 
proposed to Congress, the level of agency input used to develop the initiative, the 
political circumstances that the president faced at the time of its proposal, and the 
legislative outputs and outcomes. 
The data I use build on Rudalevige’s (2002) previous work in a number of ways.  
To begin with, I update Rudalevige’s (2002) dataset to include Bill Clinton’s second 
term in office and seven years of the George W. Bush presidency.  The universe of 
messages I sample combines the previous work of Rudalevige (2002) that sampled 384 
presidential initiative observations from a universe of 2,796 messages with my updated 
universe of observations that adds 1,443 messages.  Consequently, the 466 presidential 
initiative messages that I sample to conduct my analyses constitute 10.99% of a universe 
of 4,239 total messages. 
I also use my sample of observations in a different way.  Rudalevige (2002) 
traced the legislative prehistory of each presidential initiative.  He specifically focused 
on the extent to which centralizing policy development lowered managerial costs and 
                                                 
8
 To generate a universe of presidential proposal messages from the Public Papers of the President, I build 
on previous work by Rudalevige (2002) who used State of the Union messages, presidential legislative 
Boxscores compiled by Congressional Quarterly, and a replication of Light’s (1999) collection of the 
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) central clearance data and internal reports of the Legislative 
Reference Division to help identify the elements of each president’s legislative program. 
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influenced legislative success.  However, I apply the technique to measure the level of 
agency input that the president employed and to test whether and how such input 
influences both legislative success and the substance of an initiative from the proposal 
stage to passage.   
I add other new variables to compliment my theoretical framework and employ 
enhanced measures of previously adopted control measures that relate to policy success 
in the legislative arena.  I provide two new measures of presidential signaling to 
determine whether more voluminous signaling of a presidential proposal also helps to 
increase the likelihood of presidential legislative success.  I also derive improved 
measures to control for the ideological makeup of Congress, crosscutting jurisdictions, 
and the influence of presidential approval at both the time of proposal and passage.  
Below I describe in full detail each of the variables I employ for my main analyses of 
agency input influence on presidential policy success in Congress. 
Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable is presidential legislative success for each 
presidential initiative proposed to the Congress.  I measure presidential policy making 
success in Congress as a dichotomous variable where “1” represents successful passage 
of a presidential initiative through one or both chambers of Congress and “0” otherwise.  
Although most of the observations for my data sample consist of proposals that both 
chambers of Congress considered, there are some proposals for which only one chamber 
is applicable.  In cases where one chamber of the legislature does not take up a measure, 
I code the outcome as “0” to indicate a failure on the part of the president to have the 
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proposal taken seriously by that chamber.9  The level of success may thus range from 
those initiatives that were at the very least submitted for consideration in a chamber to 
those that passed through both chambers and that the president signed into law. 
The other main dependent variable is change in policy substance of a presidential 
initiative from the proposal stage to passage.  More specifically, it measures the extent of 
changes that legislators make to the substance of a presidential policy initiative once the 
president proposes it to Congress to undergo legislative scrutiny.  To code changes in 
policy substance of a presidential initiative from the proposal stage to passage, I look at 
the Public Papers of the President and the THOMAS legislative resource webpage to 
compare the text of the president’s formal proposal to the text of the legislative bill that 
passes into law.   
Specifically, I code policy proposals that have little to no change in substance 
from proposal to passage as a level “0” change, ones that have changes but maintain the 
core of the president’s proposed policy preferences as a level “1” change, ones that 
contain less than half of the president’s proposed policy preferences as a level “2” 
change, and proposal that either completely change in substance from proposal to 
passage or that simply fail to pass into law as a level “3” change.  In cases where only 
one chamber takes up a policy proposal, I code the other chamber’s observation as a 
level “3” change if the policy fails and as a level “0” change if it passes into law.  As 
with my measure for agency input, this measure, although not exact, is a relative 
                                                 
9
 Out of the total sample of 466 observations, there are 72 observations of proposals that only the House 
considered, 29 observations that only the Senate considered, and 361 observations that went through both 
chambers. 
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approximation placed on an ordinal scale and thus allows the comparison of hundreds of 
observations across the eleven administrations under study. 
Agency Input 
In accordance with my main theoretical framework, I expect that a president’s 
utilization of agency input in the development of a policy proposal will increase its 
likelihood of passage through Congress.  To identify presidential initiatives and measure 
agency input, I utilize an array of primary and secondary source archival records that 
include the Public Papers of the President, the THOMAS legislative archival information 
resource of the U.S. Library of Congress, the GovTrack information archive on 
congressional data, and the LexisNexis academic, congressional, and government 
periodical indexes. 
I measure agency input on an ordinal scale (1-5) ranging from highly centralized 
policy initiatives that presidents develop with the aid of only their closest advisors to 
highly decentralized policy initiatives for which presidents defer most of their 
development to civil servant agency actors.  More specifically, I code the ordinal scale 
for agency input as follows: “1” represents a policy that is a product of staffers within 
the White House Office, “2” represents a product of centralized staff outside the White 
House Office, such as in the Budget Bureau/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
or the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), “3” represents a product of mixed origin, 
with the White House in the lead, “4” represents a product of mixed White House and 
agency/departmental origin, with the agency/department taking the lead role, and “5” 
represents a product of executive branch agencies and/or departments. 
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Presidential Signaling 
Signaling is a policy making tool that presidents employ to alert legislators of 
their priorities and propose specific policy initiatives for them to consider (Esbaugh-
Soha 2006).  The measure of presidential signaling I apply follows the work of Esbaugh-
Soha (2006) to capture the overall volume of a signal.  Specifically, I measure the 
number of paragraphs dedicated to a presidential policy initiative in a presidential 
message, which helps to gauge whether the volume of a given proposal within a message 
influences the likelihood that legislators will consider a policy initiative seriously and 
more positively. 
New Issues and Issue Complexity 
 In accordance with my theoretical framework, I expect that new issues and issue 
complexity each decrease the likelihood of proposal passage.  A new issue is one that 
that presents a societal problem for which no president or legislator has previously 
offered a policy solution.  Examples include the earliest initiative put forth to deal with 
terrorism, the first Medicaid bill proposed, the proposal for the do not call registry bill, 
and the first legislative initiative put forth to prohibit the cloning of humans.  Old issues 
are those that represent refinements, alterations, or reauthorizations of existing laws.  I 
measure new issues as a dichotomous variable where “1” represents issues that are new 
to the policy agenda and “0” otherwise (see Rudalevige 2002, 89-90). 
To measure issue complexity, I use a three-point index (see Light 1999, 119; 
Rudalevige 2002).  Initially applied by Light (1999) as a “large/small” dichotomy 
between small requests not intended to alter existing laws and those that are, Rudalevige 
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(2002, 91) expanded the “large” category measure between proposals requiring technical 
expertise in limited areas and those large in scope that require expertise across a 
multitude of policy areas, thereby creating the three-point index. 
Crosscutting Jurisdictions 
Presidents at times address policy issues that cut across multiple congressional 
committees.  If multiple committees are involved, legislators may engage in turf wars on 
who holds jurisdiction over the substance and transferal of a given proposal, which 
makes it difficult for presidents to gauge how best to develop an initiative for proposal to 
avoid congressional opposition (Oleszek 1996, 17; see also Shepsle 1989; King 1997; 
Groseclose and King 1998).  I therefore expect that initiatives representing crosscutting 
jurisdictions will decrease the likelihood of proposal passage. 
To track the number of legislative committees that have jurisdiction over a given 
initiative, I use the THOMAS and GovTrack legislative archival information resources.  
I measure crosscutting jurisdictions in two ways and apply measures for the House and 
Senate in separate models.  In order to control for overall committee jurisdictional 
influence, I created an alternate measure that codes “1” for cases where only a single 
committee takes up an initiative, “2” for a case where two committees are involved, and 
“3” for cases where three or more committees are involved.10 
                                                 
10
 Prior to employing this variable, I applied a more straightforward measure that included the total 
number of legislative committees in each chamber that have jurisdiction over the substance of a given 
policy initiative.  However, measuring the total number of committees may overstate the true extent to 
which crosscutting jurisdictions may obstruct the passage of a bill.  Indeed, it is sometimes the case that 
three major committees hold the most influence over the outcome of a given initiative even though a 
number of additional subcommittees may also be involved.  That said, a comparison of both measures 
across different models indicates no significant changes for the variable coefficients.  Consequently, I 
apply the latter, more parsimonious ordinal measure. 
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Reorganization Impact 
Proposals that constitute reorganization of one or more agencies may result in 
congressional opposition and a lower likelihood of proposal passage for a number of 
reasons (Wilson 1989, 268; Rudalevige 2002, 126-7; see also Arnold 1998, 18-20).  
Perhaps most the most fundamental cause of opposition is “a proprietary sense of the 
departments and agencies as they stand, since they were created by Congress in the first 
place” (Rudalevige 2002, 126).  Agency reorganization may also constitute a shift in 
congressional committee oversight responsibilities and those who hold jurisdiction at the 
time of proposal are unlikely want to cede that authority to another committee (see 
Wilson 1989, 268). 
Last, the prospect of agency actors providing advice for the reorganization of 
their own agency makes it less likely that legislators will view the advice of agency 
actors as objective and reliable, particularly if the proposed reforms threaten an agency’s 
hierarchical stability or remove jurisdictional authority over a certain policy sphere.  
This lack of trust in agency input increases the likelihood that presidents will centralize 
the development of reorganization proposals and thus further reduce the likelihood of 
proposal passage (see Rudalevige 2002, 126).  Taken together, I expect that 
departmental and congressional opposition as well as a higher likelihood of centralized 
policy development each decrease the likelihood of proposal passage.  I measure 
reorganization initiatives as a dichotomous variable that equals “1” if a policy initiative 
calls for a reorganization effort for a given department or agency and “0” otherwise. 
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Ideology and Majority Control of Congress 
Presidents have a much better chance of getting their policy proposals passed 
into law when they have a high level of ideological and party support in Congress (see 
Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990).  Although closely linked, each of these factors 
also has an independent and significant effect on presidential legislative success (Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997).  I therefore expect that increased ideological and party support in 
Congress increases the likelihood of proposal passage.  To control for the president’s 
general level of party support in Congress, I employ the standard dichotomous variable 
for divided government where “1” equals a state of divided government control and “0” 
otherwise.11 
Another important measure concerning the makeup of Congress concerns the 
ideological distance between the president and each chamber pivot.  Specifically, I 
measure the president’s ideological proximity to (a) the Senate cloture pivot and (a) the 
House median pivot using separate models for each chamber in order to avoid problems 
of multicollinearity.12  Specifically, I use Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) common space 
coordinates to measures the distance from the Senate to the president, using the cloture 
pivot common space coordinates for the Senate posited by Krehbiel (1998), which 
                                                 
11
 I also apply an alternative measure of the percentage of seats the president holds in each chamber.  
Although this measure provides a more approximate measure of the level of party support the president 
holds in a given chamber, it does not capture the core dynamics of whether the president has majority 
control over a chamber in the way that the divided government variable does.  In any case, a comparison 
of the measures across different models indicates no significant changes for the variable coefficients. 
12
 As alternative measures, I also calculate the absolute value of the difference between the Senate 
majority party leader and the president and do the same for Speaker of the House and the president (see 
also Rudalevige 2002, 93-5).  Note that, although the Speaker of the House does not participate in roll call 
voting (except in special circumstances) during his or her tenure, the common space coordinate scores 
provide lifetime liberalism measures that are applicable to control for the distance between the president 
and the speaker’s ideology.  As expected, a comparison of the measures across different models indicates 
no significant changes for the variable coefficients. 
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involve the 66th vote pivot ideological score for all the years preceding 1974 and the 60th 
vote pivot ideological score for the years thereafter.  In a separate model, I employ the 
House median pivot to capture the ideological distance between the president and the 
House of Representatives. 
Presidential Approval 
As with previous studies on the presidency, I expect that high public approval of 
the president is likely to aid the president in achieving one’s policy agenda goals.  
Regarding legislative behavior, presidential approval allows member of Congress to 
gauge whether they should support a certain presidential policy proposal.  In other 
words, how strongly the public approves of the president should influence congressional 
behavior with respect to the passage of presidential policy initiatives (see Edwards 1989, 
2003).  This means that when approval ratings are high, members of Congress are more 
likely to support a president’s legislative proposals (Edwards 1980, 1983; Edwards 
1991; Brace and Hinckley 1992, 1993).  I therefore expect that increased approval of the 
president increases the likelihood of proposal passage.  I measure presidential approval 
as the percentage approval of the president according to the most recent Gallup poll prior 
to the proposal of a presidential initiative. 
An additional measure of presidential approval concerns the change in approval 
from proposal to the time of passage or legislative defeat.  Controlling for the change in 
presidential approval is also important because, as Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003, 97) 
find, “Not only does the president’s public approval rise and fall over time, the 
interpretation that members of Congress place on a given level or change in approval 
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also is likely to vary over time.”  I measure change in presidential approval by 
subtracting the percentage approval of the president according to the most recent Gallup 
poll prior to the proposal of a presidential initiative from the percentage approval of the 
president once a decision is made on a proposal in each chamber of Congress.  
Typically, a final decision is the roll call vote for a given bill, but can also constitute the 
date that Congress adjourns for cases where a bill simply dies and does not come to a 
vote.  As with the measures for ideological congressional makeup, I use separate 
measures for each chamber decision in separate models for the House and Senate. 
“First Mover” Chamber 
 A major premise of my theoretical framework is that the ability of presidents to 
develop and propose their policy initiatives determines whether Congress will pass their 
initiatives into law.  However, in deciding whether to consider and/or approve a given 
presidential proposal, one chamber of Congress may also take into consideration the 
actions of the other chamber.  For instance, if one chamber is the “first mover” and 
overwhelmingly rejects the proposal of a given presidential initiative, the other chamber 
may decide not to consider the measure at all.  If, on the other hand, the “first mover” 
overwhelmingly passes a given initiative into law, the other chamber may be more likely 
to follow suit.  In cases of a close outcome and/or certain compromise on the part of the 
first mover, the other chamber may react strategically to either pass a similar bill or pass 
a bill that would require further compromise from the first mover before reaching the 
president’s desk.  To control for the influence of the “first mover” chamber, I include a 
dummy variable for each model where “1” signifies an observation for which the 
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chamber under investigation is the “first mover” and “0” otherwise. 
Time in Term 
An important environmental factor to consider is time in term.  Time generally 
constrains the ability for Congress to get through appropriations bills, reauthorizations, 
and their general workload.  I therefore expect that an increase of the amount of a 
president’s time in term decreases the likelihood of proposal passage.  I measure time in 
term as the number of months a president has served in office (reset after re-election; see 
Rudalevige 2002, 141-2).  Because initiatives proposed introduced in the second year of 
a Congress are just inherently less likely to pass because there is less time to work on 
them, I also add a second measure for time in term that accounts for the year of each 
Congress, where “0” is the first year and “1” is the second. 
Deficit (Budget Situation) 
With regards to the budgetary situation, one may expect that proposal success 
decreases as the deficit grows, since spending cuts are more likely and may prevent the 
availability of funding for institution a particular presidential initiative.  Alternatively, 
the advent of a budgetary surplus is likely to increase the number of proposals passed in 
a year because greater funding for more government programs and other spending 
opportunities.  I thus expect that an increasing deficit decreases the likelihood of 
proposal passage.  I calculate the deficit variable using the standard measure for the 
fiscal year deficit (or surplus) divided by the total federal outlays (see Rudalevige 2002, 
   40    
 
 
141-3).13 
Administration Dummy Variables 
 Another additional factor to consider in explaining presidential leadership of 
Congress is how the idiosyncratic effects of individual presidents and their 
administrations may influence legislative success.  To address this influence, I employ 
separate dummy administration controls for each empirical model of my analyses. 
Priority 
Last, if the president designates a high priority for a particular proposal, the 
Congress may be more likely to take the proposal seriously.  Rudalevige (2002, 140) 
employs a “priority” dichotomous independent variable measured as whether the 
president includes an item in a State of the Union address.  He uses the variable as a 
means to address any potential endogeneity between centralization and policy 
controversy or the “ex ante level of divisiveness” in a proposal.  However, Rudalevige’s 
measure is problematic theoretically and empirically.  Theoretically, the inclusion of a 
proposal in a State of the Union address should not serve solely as a proxy measure for 
the level of controversy associated with a presidential initiative.  Indeed, presidents have 
included a vast array of presidential proposals in their State of the Union messages, 
which may range from being highly controversial to being highly bipartisan in nature.  
Instead, a dichotomous measure of whether presidents include items in their State of the 
Union messages may better capture the level of priority in terms of the likelihood that 
                                                 
13
 An alternative control I employ measures the percentage of the fiscal year deficit (or surplus) divided by 
the overall gross domestic product (GDP).  The results for this alternate measure did not change the 
coefficient outcomes for any of the various models employed and, because the measure is not a major 
independent variable, I have simply dropped it from my analyses. 
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presidents will place them at the forefront of their policy agendas.  Conversely, although 
all initiatives in a State of the Union address have, to some degree, a higher level of 
priority given the high saliency of the speech itself, only a handful of all the initiatives in 
such a speech may be of particularly high priority to the president. 
A close look at Rudalevige’s sampled items indicates that many of the 
observations of initiatives that presidents included in State of the Union messages are not 
of top priority and thus do not provide a strong enough measure of a given initiative’s 
level of priority (see Rudalevige 2002; Appendix A.2).  For these reasons, I have 
dropped the measure from my own analyses.  I instead focus on the variable for 
presidential signaling to help capture the level of importance or priority for a given 
initiative that the president wishes to convey to the Congress. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I have described the methodology I employ for collecting and 
measuring the data for my analyses.  I have also provided detailed explanations of all the 
variables that are relevant for assessing the influence of agency input on presidential 
policy making success in the legislative arena.  For the next chapter, I will test my main 
hypotheses by employing the data and methodology described above.  I will then move 
to assess how agency input may also influence the content of a presidential initiative 
from proposal stage to passage. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF AGENCY INPUT ON PRESIDENTIAL 
POLICY SUCCESS IN CONGRESS 
Despite the large amount of attention scholars have placed on presidential 
leadership in the legislative arena, very little research has considered how the 
management of information at the presidential policy development stage influences 
legislative policy making outcomes.  In response to this dearth of knowledge, I have 
developed a theoretical framework that prescribes a new policy making strategy with 
agency input at its core.  In particular, I have argued that agency input may afford 
presidential policy development with a measure of agency expertise and objectivity, 
process transparency, and agency support, each of which can markedly decrease the 
costs of moving a policy proposal through Congress. 
In this chapter, I test my theoretical framework through a series of empirical 
analyses.  As I outlined in Chapter III, my main empirical analyses consist of logit 
pooled cross-sectional regression models that measure the influence of agency input on 
presidential policy making success in Congress.  I have also outlined a number of other 
variables to control for any additional factors that may influence presidential policy 
success in Congress.  In sum, I have argued that presidential policy making success in 
Congress is a function of a president’s utilization of agency input in the development of 
a policy proposal, presidential signaling, the ideology and majority control of Congress, 
presidential popularity, and a number of other control variables.  The various 
components of my theoretical framework under empirical examination are expressed in 
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mathematical form as follows: 
Legislative Success = Β1 + Agency Input + Presidential Signaling + Issue Dynamics + 
Majority Control of Congress + Legislative Ideology + Public Opinion + Temporal Factors + 
Budgetary Situation + εi 
Because of the bicameral structure of Congress, I conduct separate analyses for 
each chamber to control for the differences in the makeup and legislative procedures 
inherent in each legislative body.  Specifically, each analysis includes chamber-specific 
control variables for the number of crosscutting jurisdictions, the chamber pivot, and a 
dummy variable measuring instances where a given chamber is the “first mover” in 
considering a policy proposal.  Accordingly, I first look to the empirical examination and 
findings of the model for the Senate and then follow with an empirical examination and 
review of the findings of the model for the House of Representatives. 
Examining Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the Senate 
Presidents can benefit from the employment of agency input in policy 
development if it markedly decreases the costs of moving a proposal through Congress 
and thus increases the overall likelihood of legislative success.  As I explained in 
Chapter II, the potential of agency input as a policy making tool lies in its key elements 
of expertise, objectivity, process transparency, cooperative consultation with Congress, 
and bureaucratic support, which are valuable for convincing legislators that a 
presidential initiative presents a legitimate policy solution that merits passage into law.  
At the core of my theoretical framework, I have hypothesized (H1) that a president’s use 
of agency input in the development of a policy proposal increases its likelihood of 
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legislative passage. 
I first test my main hypothesis in the Senate.  In accordance with my 
expectations, I find that a president’s utilization of agency input does indeed increase the 
likelihood of success (see Table 1).  Specifically, the predicted probability scores 
indicate that when level of agency input changes from its minimum to maximum value 
(i.e. from the most centralized “1” to the most decentralized “5” level of agency input), 
the likelihood of presidential policy success increases by 39.52% in the Senate.  
Regarding a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard 
deviation above it, I find that the likelihood of policy success can increase by up to 
13.73%.  Given that the mean value for these observations is approximately 3.13 (i.e. 
level “3”) and that a half standard deviation represents a change of 1.32, a full-standard 
deviation shift represents a move from employing a level “2” centralized policy 
development approach to employing a level “4” mixed approach with an agency taking 
the lead role and also represents an increase of nearly 14% in likelihood of legislative 
success. 
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Table 1  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 
(Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
  Level of Agency Input .422*** 4.67 .3952 .1373 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .006** 1.65 .3278 .0499 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .207 .78 - - 
  Issue Complexity .094 .61 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .098 .71 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.018 -.12 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -8.671** -2.27 -.7850 .2879 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .216 .36 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .032** 2.50 .4621 .1056 
  Change in Approval .021* 1.53 .3929 .0451 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.14 -.61 - - 
  Time in Term .003 -.52 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.285 -.15 - - 
N 466    
LR Chi² 95.60    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1491    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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The evidence shown here that decentralized policy proposals based largely on 
agency input are more likely to pass through the Senate than highly centralized ones 
contradicts long-held assertions made by Moe (1985) and others promoting the benefits 
of centralized presidential policy making strategies.  Indeed, although scholars have 
pointed out that centralized policy development can help presidents to lower their front-
end managerial costs and maximize their personal preferences, the notion that such 
benefits translate into higher levels of policy making success is, according to my 
findings, inaccurate.  Assuming that president do not give up too much in terms of 
substantive preferences, the results here demonstrate that presidents stand to benefit 
more in the long run by seeking the input of agency actors to help them obtain the 
support of legislators for passing their policy proposals into law. 
Presidential Signaling in the Senate 
  In addition to exploring how differences in policy substance can help determine 
legislative success, I also test to see whether the voluminous signaling influences the 
level of legislative support that a president can obtain for his policy initiatives.  In 
accordance with previous research, I hypothesize that more voluminous signaling 
increases the likelihood that presidents will succeed in alerting legislators to their 
priorities. 
The results indicate that increased voluminous signaling does indeed have a 
positive influence a president’s ability to pass an initiative through the Senate (see Table 
1).  Specifically, the predicted probability results show that when the volume of 
presidential signaling changes from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
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standard deviation above it, the likelihood of presidential policy success in the Senate 
increases by 4.99%.  To put these numbers in substantive terms, the mean volume for a 
given policy proposal is approximately 22.6 paragraphs and a half standard deviation is 
equal to about 15.5 paragraphs.  Accordingly, a policy proposal that is 37 or so 
paragraphs long is about 5% more likely to pass into law than one that is about 8 
paragraphs in length.  Thus, I conclude that members of the Senate are more likely to 
support presidential policy initiatives if the president places a greater emphasis on them. 
Although some past studies have included a measure for the influence of 
presidential signaling on legislative outcomes, none has tested the variable in 
conjunction with a measure for the level of agency input.  Given that the substance of an 
initiative matters and that the volume of that substance also matters in the form that a 
president proposes said initiative, it stands to reason that an interactive relationship may 
exist between the two concepts.  Specifically, it may be that initiatives developed from 
high levels of agency input are particularly potent when proposed by the president in 
highly voluminous messages.  In Chapter VI, I will consider whether an interactive 
relationship between agency input and signaling exists and, if so, explore further how 
presidents can benefit from such a relationship. 
Issue Dynamics in the Senate 
 Given my focus on policy substance, it stands to reason that the type of issue at 
hand has an important influence on the dynamics that fall into play between the 
president, executive branch staff, and members of Congress.  However, I do not find any 
significant relationships for issue novelty, issue complexity, crosscutting jurisdictions, or 
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reorganization impact for the Senate model.  Thus, although scholars have observed an 
influence of issue dynamics in certain salient case studies, it appears here that issue 
dynamics in the Senate are largely inconsequential when examined across decades of 
presidential legislative proposal observations and that other factors are more dominant in 
determining legislative success. 
Ideology in the Senate 
Scholars find presidents have only a marginal ability to overcome ideological 
barriers in Congress and get legislators to follow their lead (see Edwards 1989; Bond 
and Fleisher 1990).  In this sense, presidential leadership of the legislative arena is 
largely depends on the Congress a president inherits.  In accordance with the past 
literature, I find that the ideology of the Senate plays a major role in determining 
presidential legislative success.   
The results demonstrate that an increase in the ideological distance between the 
executive and the Senate decreases the likelihood that a presidential proposal will pass 
into law (see Table 1).  Regarding a change in a half standard deviation above and below 
the mean, I find that an increase in the ideological distance between the president and the 
Senate cloture pivot can decrease the likelihood of presidential legislative success by up 
to 28.79%.  Given that a half standard deviation represents an increase in ideological 
distance of about .07 in the Senate (on a -1 to 1 scale), this means that a total ideological 
distance of about .14 between the Senate cloture pivot and the president can decrease the 
likelihood of legislative success by nearly one-third. 
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Majority Control in the Senate 
Regarding the majority control of Congress, the results in Table 1 show an 
insignificant relationship between divided government and legislative success in the 
Senate.  The reason for this outcome is due mainly to the presence of autocorrelation 
between the divided government and the Senate cloture pivot measure.  Specifically, 
although the pair-wise correlation between divided government and the Senate cloture 
pivot (corr = .5175) is relatively low, the autocorrelation between the variables when 
included together in the model for the Senate is notable.  Indeed, a test for Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) values indicates that the divided government and Senate cloture 
pivot variables surpass the accepted levels of autocorrelation when both are included in 
the full model (i.e., the values are > 10).  Nevertheless, I have included both of these 
variables in my main model for the Senate because they are individually and 
theoretically important, with each one capturing distinct measures of the makeup of 
Congress. 
Also, as I noted in Chapter III, an alternative measure of majority control is the 
percentage of seats the president’s party holds in the Senate.  This variable provides a 
more approximate measure of the level of party support the president holds in a given 
chamber than the divided government variable, but does not capture the core dynamics 
of whether the president has majority control over a chamber.  In any case, substituting 
this measure for divided government does not eliminate the autocorrelation issue 
between the ideological and partisan control measures. 
For sensitivity analyses, I test three additional empirical models, each of which 
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includes only one of three congressional control variables—divided government, the 
Senate cloture pivot, and the percentage of seats the president’s party holds in the 
Senate—and provide the results in the Appendix (see Tables A-1 and A-2).  Each of 
these models demonstrates that all three of the variables have significant coefficient 
outcomes when applied in separate models.  More importantly, the results demonstrate 
that the correlation values and levels of significance for my main independent 
variables—namely agency input and presidential signaling—remain essentially 
unchanged across all of the alternative models.  I thus conclude that, despite the 
autocorrelation issue, my main model for the Senate, which includes both the ideological 
and majority control measures, provides a valid and reliable measure of the relationships 
under study. 
Presidential Approval and Senate Success 
Public opinion of the president is also a major factor in determining whether 
Congress will pass a given presidential proposal into law (Edwards 1989, 2003; see also 
Brace and Hinckley 1992).  Members of Congress are more likely to support a 
president’s legislative proposals when approval ratings of the president are high and if 
the level of approval increases from the time a president proposes an initiative until the 
time legislators make a final decision on it (see Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003). 
In accordance past studies, the predicted probability results for the Senate 
indicate that a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard 
deviation above it may increase the likelihood of presidential policy success by 10.56% 
(see Table 1).  Given that a half standard deviation represents about a 6.5 percentage 
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point change in approval, this means that a total shift of 13 percentage points can 
increase or decrease the president’s likelihood of legislative success by nearly 11%. 
In addition, I find that the change in public approval from proposal of an 
initiative to its outcome also has a significant influence on the president’s ability to 
move policy initiatives through Congress.  Specifically, the predicted probability results 
for the Senate demonstrate that a half standard deviation above and below the mean 
increases in approval from the time a president proposes an initiative to its final outcome 
may increase the likelihood of presidential policy success by 4.51%.  In substantive 
terms, a change of about 8 percentage points in approval from the time the president 
proposes an initiative to the time Congress makes a final decision can increase or 
decrease the likelihood of success by about 4.5% in the Senate. 
Temporal Factors and the Budgetary Situation 
 As with most political phenomena, timing can be a crucial component that 
influences outcomes.  A president that proposes an initiative at the right time under the 
most ideal conditions is generally more likely to succeed than otherwise.  The two 
factors I consider with respect to timing are whether the Senate is the “first mover” in 
taking action on a given proposal before the House does and the president’s time in term 
when proposing a given initiative.  Despite my theoretical expectations, I do not find any 
significant results for either of the time control factors.  In addition, I test to see if the 
budgetary situation plays a role in determining whether a presidential policy proposal 
will pass into law.  However, I find that the budgetary situation is also not a major factor 
in determining the legislative outcomes of presidential policy making efforts in the 
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Senate. 
Examining Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the House 
Given the strong empirical support in the Senate model suggesting that the 
substance of a policy initiative serves as an important influence on legislative outputs, I 
now look at how agency input influences success in the House of Representatives.  
Accordingly, I again test my main hypothesis (H1) that a president’s use of agency input 
in the development of a policy proposal increases its likelihood of passage, but this time 
with respect to the lower chamber.  Save for a few slight differences concerning the 
chamber-specific control variables, the results of my analyses for the House are 
strikingly similar to those of the Senate, suggesting that nearly identical dynamics fall 
into play for both chambers of Congress. 
As is the case with the model for the Senate, the empirical findings for the House 
of Representatives provide evidence that the employment of agency input significantly 
increases a president’s likelihood of success in Congress.  In particular, the predicted 
probability scores indicate that when level of agency input changes from its minimum to 
maximum value (i.e. from the most centralized “1” to the most decentralized “5” level of 
agency input), the likelihood of presidential policy success in Congress increases by 
39.96% in the House (see Table 2).   
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Table 2  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the House, 1949-2007 
(Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
  Level of Agency Input .427*** 4.73 .3996 .1390 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .007** 1.86 .3519 .0555 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .206 .78 - - 
  Issue Complexity .077 .51 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .172** 1.70 .3522 .0504 
  Reorganization Impact -.04 -.25 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -6.486*** -2.23 -.7269 .2708 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.029 -.05 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .033*** 2.59 .4777 .1098 
  Change in Approval .026** 1.80 .4663 .0551 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .147 .64 - - 
  Time in Term -.005 -.82 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.518 -.82 - - 
N 466    
LR Chi² 98.64    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1539    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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  Regarding the change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
standard deviation above it, the results show that the likelihood of policy success can 
increase by up to 13.9%.  Substantively, this means that presidents are about 14% more 
likely to succeed in the House if they develop a policy proposal approximating a level 
“4” amount of agency input than if they employ a level “2” amount.  Thus, employing 
agency input in policy development can play an essential role in helping presidents 
succeed in obtaining support in both chambers of Congress. 
Presidential Signaling in the House 
 As I mention in the section on the Senate, because the substance of a proposal 
matters, it stands to reason that a more voluminous signal of a proposal developed with 
agency input may provide a particularly potent, positive influence on legislative success.  
As expected, the results indicate that increased voluminous signaling does indeed have a 
positive influence on legislative success in the House.  Specifically, the predicted 
probability results indicate that a change from a half standard deviation below the mean 
to a half standard deviation above it increases the likelihood of presidential policy 
success in the House by 5.55%.  Put in perspective with the results of the model for the 
Senate, I come to the general conclusion that members of Congress are more likely to 
pass presidential policy initiatives into law if the president places a greater emphasis on 
their proposal. 
As I noted previously for the Senate, given that the substance and the volume of 
that substance both matter, it may be that an interactive relationship exists between the 
two concepts.  Specifically, I raise the possibility that initiatives developed from high 
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levels of agency input may be particularly potent when proposed by the president as a 
highly voluminous message.  Given this prospect, I focus in the next chapter on whether 
an interactive relationship between agency input and signaling exists.  If so, I further 
explore how presidents can capitalize on such a relationship as they seek to maximize 
their policy making performance in the legislative arena. 
Issue Dynamics in the House 
With respect to the influence of various issue dynamics, the only one that appears 
to influence presidential policy success in the House of Representatives is the presence 
of a high number of crosscutting jurisdictions.  The results in Table 2 show that an 
increase in the number of jurisdictions cutting across multiple executive agencies and 
congressional committees for a given initiative serves as a positive influence on 
deliberations that determine proposal outcomes in the House.  Specifically, I find that an 
increase from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half deviation above it 
increases the likelihood of presidential policy success in the House by up to 5.04%.  
Substantively, the mean number of crosscutting jurisdictions is about 1.64 with a half 
standard deviation value of about 1.2 such that a change from approximately no 
crosscutting jurisdictions to approximately three can increase the likelihood of 
legislative success by about 5% in the House only. 
Although this finding lies in contrast to my theoretical expectations, it stands to 
reason that crosscutting jurisdictions for a given policy issue may lead to increased 
presidential success if the multiple agencies and/or congressional committees find a high 
level of compatibility amongst themselves when communicating their policy preferences 
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to each other regarding a given issue. 
Ideology in the House 
As I noted above, scholars have come to the consensus that presidential 
leadership of the legislative arena is largely a function of the hand one is dealt with 
respect to the makeup of Congress.  As with the model for the Senate, I find that 
ideology in the House of Representatives plays a major role in determining presidential 
legislative success. 
The results demonstrate that an increase in the ideological distance between the 
executive and the House decreases the likelihood that a presidential proposal will pass 
into law (see Table 2).  Regarding the ideological distance between the president the 
House median pivot, I find that a change in a half standard deviation above and below 
the mean decreases the likelihood of proposal passage by 27.08%.  Similar to the Senate 
results, I thus find that since a half standard deviation represents an increase in 
ideological distance of about .09 in the Senate (on a -1 to 1 scale), a total ideological 
distance of about .18 between the House median pivot and the president can therefore 
decrease the likelihood of legislative success by about 27%. 
Majority Control of the House 
As with the results for the Senate regarding the majority control of the Congress, 
the model for the House also shows an insignificant relationship between divided 
government and legislative success (see Table 2).  As I explained previously, the reason 
for this outcome is due mainly to the presence of autocorrelation between the divided 
government and the cloture pivot measures.  Again, despite the presence of 
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autocorrelation, I nevertheless include both variables in the model because their pair-
wise correlation outcomes are acceptably low and particularly because they are 
individually and theoretically important, with each one capturing distinct measures of 
the makeup of Congress. 
As with the Senate results, I test three additional empirical models for sensitivity 
analyses, each of which includes only one of three congressional control variables—
divided government, the House median pivot, and the percentage of seats the president’s 
party holds in the House—and provide the results in the Appendix (see Tables A-3 and 
A-4).  Each of these models demonstrates that all three of the variables have significant 
coefficient outcomes when applied in separate models.  As with the Senate results, the 
correlation values and levels of significance for my main independent variables—
namely agency input and presidential signaling—remain essentially unchanged across all 
of the alternative models for the House.  I thus conclude that, despite the autocorrelation 
issue, my main model for the House provides a valid and reliable measure of the 
relationships under study. 
Presidential Approval and House Success 
In accordance with past studies and the findings for the Senate model, the 
predicted probability results of the influence of presidential approval on success in the 
House indicate a positive and significant relationship (see Table 2).  Specifically, I find 
that a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation 
above it may increase the likelihood of presidential policy success by 10.98% (see Table 
2).  Given that a half standard deviation for each chamber represents about a 6.5 
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percentage point change in approval, this means that a total shift of 13 points can 
increase or decrease the president’s likelihood of legislative success by nearly 11%, 
which practically mirrors the results for the Senate. 
Just as public approval of the president matters, the change in approval over time 
from proposal to the final outcome also matters for the House of Representatives.  In 
particular, I find that a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
standard deviation above it may increase the likelihood of presidential policy success by 
5.51%.  In substantive terms, an increase of about 8 percentage points in approval from 
the time the president proposes an initiative to the time of a final decision can increase or 
decrease the likelihood of success by about 5.5% in the House. 
Temporal Factors and the Budgetary Situation 
 As with the Senate results, the two factors I consider with respect to timing—the 
“first mover” dummy variable and the president’s time in term—do not show a 
significant relationship in my main analysis for the House.  As well, I again find that the 
budgetary situation also does not appear to be a major factor in determining the 
legislative outcomes of presidential policy making efforts in the House. 
Summary 
The empirical evidence that agency input significantly increases presidential 
policy success in Congress provides a new window for better understanding how 
presidents can succeed as policymakers.  In accordance with my theoretical framework, 
it appears that the key component of agency input—bureaucratic expertise—has a strong 
potential to increase the president’s chances of obtaining legislative support for his 
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policy initiatives.  In addition, when presidents seek the advice of agency actors, they are 
more likely to obtain policy competent solutions that aid their political goals and help to 
create powerful organizational incentives for agency actors to be responsive to their 
needs, particularly for the post enactment phase.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom 
of past research, I find that presidents can achieve policy competent solutions without 
forfeiting staff responsiveness so long as they do not lose sight of their institutional 
interests in pursuit of their partisan political ones.  All else equal, agency input imbues 
presidential proposals with bureaucratic legitimacy and aids their passage into law. 
In light of these findings, scholars should reconsider the theoretical framework 
that explains how presidents can act rationally in their own best interests.  Thus, rather 
than focus on how presidents might lower information costs and maximize their personal 
preferences, scholars should instead focus on how presidents can overcome legislative 
obstacles by seeking the expert and relatively more objective input of agency actors 
regardless of the higher up-front costs.  In doing so, scholars should also explore the 
extent to which presidents might compromise on their personal preferences in order to 
insure that their policy goals will pass into law.  After all, it makes little sense for 
presidents to try to minimize their managerial costs and maximize their personal 
preferences if such efforts will be more likely to end in legislative defeat. 
To build on the findings of this chapter, it is necessary to subsequently explore at 
what level of agency input presidents can maximize their chances of success.  It is 
important to determine whether a fully decentralized versus a more mixed approach 
holds the most potential for markedly increasing a president’s likelihood of policy 
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success in Congress.  In doing so, I also expect that more voluminous signaling at each 
level of agency input may further increase the likelihood of proposal passage.  
Accordingly, after testing my other major dependent variable measure in the next 
chapter, I will then look to determine at which level of agency input do presidents have 
the greatest potential for obtaining congressional support and to see whether an 
interactive effect with more voluminous signaling at such level holds the key for 
presidents to maximize their policy making performance. 
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CHAPTER V 
MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF AGENCY INPUT ON CHANGE IN 
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY SUBSTANCE IN CONGRESS 
The finding that agency input can increase presidential policy success in 
Congress suggests broadly that presidents are wise to employ the advice of agency 
bureaucrats to help develop their policy initiatives.  However, although agency input can 
help the president move legislation through Congress, it does not necessarily mean that 
the president will be content with the outcome.  Up to this point, I have focused on how 
presidents can increase their success in outputs without addressing the substantive 
outcomes.  To build on my initial findings, I investigate how the president’s use of 
agency input for policy development influences the extent of changes that legislators 
make to the substance of presidential policy initiatives from the proposal stage to their 
legislative outcome. 
I begin by exploring the notion that agency input can lower the extent of changes 
that legislators will make to a presidential policy proposal’s substance before deciding 
on whether to pass it into law.  I next test my theoretical framework for change with a 
series of empirical analyses following the same methodological procedures applied in 
Chapter IV.  My empirical analyses consist of logit pooled cross-sectional regression 
models that measure the influence of agency input on changes in presidential policy 
substance.  As I previously described in Chapter III, I measure change in policy 
substance from the proposal stage to the legislative outcome as “0” = no change in 
policy substance, “1” = less than 50% changes made, “2” = greater than 50% changes 
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made, and “3” = mostly changed or failure.  Overall, I argue that changes in a president’s 
policy proposal substance are a function of a president’s utilization of agency input in 
the development of a policy proposal, presidential signaling, the ideology and majority 
control of Congress, presidential popularity, and a number of other control variables.  
The various components of my theoretical framework under empirical examination are 
expressed in mathematical form as follows: 
Change in Policy Substance = Β1 + Agency Input + Presidential Signaling + Issue 
Dynamics + Majority Control of Congress + Legislative Ideology + Public Opinion + Temporal 
Factors + Budgetary Situation + εi 
As with the previous analyses, I conduct separate analyses for each chamber to 
control for the differences in the makeup and legislative procedures inherent in each 
legislative body.  Each analysis includes chamber-specific control variables for the 
number of crosscutting jurisdictions, the chamber pivot, and a dummy variable 
measuring instances where a given chamber is the “first mover” in considering a policy 
proposal.  Accordingly, I first look to the empirical examination and findings of the 
model for the Senate and then follow with an empirical examination and review of the 
findings of the model for the House of Representatives. 
The Potential of Agency Input to Influence Changes in Policy Substance 
Throughout this study, I have argued that agency involvement at the policy 
development stage provides presidents with expertise, objectivity, process transparency, 
cooperative consultation with Congress, and bureaucratic support, which they need to 
obtain legislative support to pass their initiatives into law.  Given the empirical evidence 
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that agency input helps increase policy success in Congress, it is likely that lower costs 
incurred during the legislative process also decrease the extent of changes in a policy’s 
substance from proposal to passage.  Accordingly, with a specific focus on how agency 
input lowers the need for changes in policy substance, I argue that by putting forth a 
greater effort to overcome legislative barriers during the policy development process, 
presidents are less likely to experience legislative opposition once they formally propose 
an initiative.  More specifically, presidents can benefit in the long-run if they allow 
legislators to more openly observe the policy making process at the development stage 
and, in so doing, take advantage of that stage to strategically revise the policy nuances of 
their initiatives in a way that helps maximize both their personal policy goals and their 
likelihood of legislative success.   
Thus, if presidents employ agency input for the development of a policy 
proposal, it is more likely that the expert advice provided during the development phase 
will lead to congressional support during the legislative phase and thus decrease the need 
for changes in the substance of the proposal.  Accordingly, I have hypothesized (H2) that 
a president’s use of agency input in the development of a policy proposal decreases the 
extent of changes in a policy proposal’s substance from the proposal stage to its 
legislative outcome.  Having outlined my theoretical expectations, I next define and 
operationalize my measure for change in policy substance and then test my hypotheses 
for this chapter by employing a series of empirical analyses. 
Examining Agency Input Influence on Changes in Policy Substance in the Senate 
Concerning the Senate, I find that a president’s utilization of agency input 
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decreases the amount of changes in policy substance for a presidential proposal (see 
Table 3).  The predicted probability scores indicate that when level of agency input 
changes from its minimum to maximum value (i.e. from the most centralized “1” to the 
most decentralized “5” level of agency input), the likelihood of a high level of change in 
the substance of a policy initiative from its proposal to its legislative outcome decreases 
by 36.02%.  Regarding a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
standard deviation above it, I find that the probability of there being a high level of 
change in policy substance decreases by up to 12.64%.  Given that the mean value for 
these observations is approximately 3.13 (i.e. level “3”) and that a half standard 
deviation represents a change of 1.32, a full-standard deviation shift represents a move 
from employing a level “2” centralized policy development approach to employing a 
level “4” mixed approach with an agency taking the lead role and also represents a 
decrease in the probability that a high amount of changes in a proposal’s policy 
substance of nearly 13%. 
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Table 3  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in the 
Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
  Level of Agency Input -.455*** -4.69 -.3602 .1264 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .003 .91 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.071 -.26 - - 
  Issue Complexity .520*** 3.27 .2175 .0835 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.117 -.83 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.282** -1.68 -.1254 .0408 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 5.701* 1.47 .6721 .1646 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.203 -.34 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.024** -1.91 -.3174 .0695 
  Change in Approval -.03** -1.98 -.4982 .0533 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .55** 2.19 .1099 .0533 
  Time in Term .003 .47 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.949 -.048 - - 
N 466    
LR Chi² 73.37    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1250    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Along with the previous findings concerning how agency input increases the 
overall likelihood of success, I conclude that presidents can benefit greatly from 
employing agency input for policy development.  By employing agency input during the 
development phase, the president and his staff have the opportunity to communicate and 
consulted with legislators (particularly key committee members) prior to the proposal of 
an initiative and take into account their preferences and suggestions, which decreases the 
likelihood they will make further changes to the substance of an initiative once the 
president proposes it formally.  Accordingly, agency input has great potential to improve 
a president’s policy making success in both outputs and outcomes.  With respect to 
outputs, presidents are simply more likely to move their policy agenda through the 
legislative arena.  Regarding outcomes, presidents are also more likely to maximize their 
personal policy preferences by strategically addressing legislative obstacles prior to 
formally proposing their initiatives to Congress.  This notion of the maximizing 
preferences, of course, assumes that the president does not overly compromise on 
changes made during the initial development of the proposal. 
Presidential Signaling in the Senate 
 If increased agency input decreases the amount of changes in policy substance 
from a presidential initiative’s the proposal stage to its passage into law, it may also be 
that a larger volume of agency-advised substance further decrease the amount of changes 
made by legislators.  In particular, it stands to reason that a greater amount of volume for 
a proposal of a higher quality substance would require a lower amount of revision than 
otherwise.  Accordingly, I have hypothesized that more voluminous signaling at each 
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level of agency input decreases the extent of changes in a policy proposal’s substance 
from the proposal stage to its passage. 
In contrast to my expectations, the results indicate that increased voluminous 
signaling does not appear to help lower the amount of changes made by legislators to a 
policy proposal’s substance (see Table 3).  Given that the substance of an initiative 
matters but not the volume in this case, I conclude that the core substance of a policy 
proposal is what determines whether legislators will make changes to a legislative bill 
and that voluminous messages are more helpful in terms of signaling the president’s 
legislative priorities than in providing the nuanced details of his policy initiatives. 
Issue Dynamics in the Senate 
 With regards to the role that issue dynamics can play in influencing changes in 
policy substance, I again expect that the type of issue at hand may have an impact on 
how members of Congress receive a proposal and whether they will decide to revise its 
substance before passing it into law.  Specifically, I have controlled for the factors of 
issue novelty, issue complexity, crosscutting jurisdictions, and reorganization impact.  
According to the empirical results, it appears that issue complexity and reorganization 
impact both influence whether legislators are likely to make substantive changes to a 
president’s policy proposal. 
Concerning issue complexity, I find that more complex issues make it more 
likely that legislators will seek to make changes to the substance of a given proposal (see 
Table 3).  Specifically, the predicted probability results suggest that moving from the 
least to the most complex types of issues increases the likelihood that legislators will 
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make a high amount of changes to a presidential proposal by 21.75%.  In addition, given 
an increase from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation 
above it, the likelihood of changes to policy substance can increase by up to 8.35%.  
Substantively, given that the mean level of complexity is 2.042 on a three-point scale 
with a half standard deviation value of about .764, a full standard deviation shift increase 
raises the likelihood of changes being made by about 8% in the Senate.  One reason that 
complex proposals may require more changes prior to their passage into law is that they 
are more likely to fall into agency and congressional committee turf wars and thus lead 
legislators to competing sources of bureaucratic advice.  To overcome such 
complexities, legislators may need to make compromises and add certain amendments to 
the core of a presidential proposal before generating enough legislative support to have 
the initiative passed into law. 
As I mentioned in Chapter III, proposals that constitute reorganization of one or 
more agencies may result in greater congressional opposition.  According to the 
empirical findings, however, it appears that a proposal that has a reorganization impact 
may actually decrease the likelihood that legislators will make changes to a presidential 
proposal.  Specifically, the predicted probability results from the minimum to maximum 
value suggest that an initiative that makes a reorganization impact may decrease the 
likelihood of a high amount of changes to a proposal by 12.54%.  This result is 
surprising since legislators are unlikely to defer discretion to the president over 
reorganizing an agency because, although the president presides as the head of the 
executive branch, the Congress is also responsible for designing the legislation that 
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creates federal agencies and should therefore be more wary about the jurisdiction over 
such changes (see Seidman and Gilmore 1986).  Nevertheless, the results suggest 
jurisdictional warfare is less, rather than more, likely when it comes to revising policy 
initiatives put forth by the president.  Accordingly, it may instead be the case that 
presidents are more likely to consult with legislators prior to proposing such initiatives 
and that legislators are therefore less likely to make further changes. 
Ideology in the Senate 
As I mentioned previously, scholars find presidents have only a marginal ability 
to overcome ideological barriers in Congress and get legislators to follow their lead (see 
Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990).  Concerning the measure for change in policy 
substance, it is likely that an increase ideological distance between the president and the 
Senate also increases the likelihood that senators will seek to make changes to a 
president’s policy proposal. 
The results demonstrate that an increase in the ideological distance between the 
executive and the Senate does indeed increases the likelihood of substantive policy 
changes made to a presidential proposal prior to its legislative outcome (see Table 3).  
Regarding a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard 
deviation above it, I find that an increase in the ideological distance between the 
president and the Senate cloture pivot can increase the likelihood of substantive policy 
changes by up to 16.46%.  Given that a half standard deviation represents an increase in 
ideological distance of about .07 in the Senate (on a -1 to 1 scale), this means that a total 
ideological distance of about .14 between the Senate cloture pivot and the president 
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significantly increases the likelihood of changes to policy substance. 
Majority Control in the Senate 
Regarding the majority control of Congress, the results in Table 3 show an 
insignificant relationship between divided government and legislative success in the 
Senate.  As with the previous analyses, the reason for this outcome is due mainly to the 
presence of autocorrelation between the divided government and the Senate cloture pivot 
measure.  Specifically, although the pair-wise correlation between divided government 
and the Senate cloture pivot (corr = .5175) is relatively low, the autocorrelation between 
the variables when included together in the model for the Senate is notable.  Indeed, a 
test for Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values indicates that the divided government and 
Senate cloture pivot variables surpass the accepted levels of autocorrelation when both 
are included in the full model (i.e., the values are > 10).  Nevertheless, I have once again 
included both of these variables in my main model for the Senate because they are 
individually and theoretically important, with each one capturing distinct measures of 
the makeup of Congress. 
As in Chapter IV, I also apply an alternative measure of majority control—the 
percentage of seats the president’s party holds in the Senate.  This variable provides a 
more approximate measure of the level of party support the president holds in a given 
chamber than the divided government variable, but does not capture the core dynamics 
of whether the president has majority control over a chamber.  In any case, substituting 
this measure for divided government does not eliminate the autocorrelation issue 
between the ideological and partisan control measures. 
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For sensitivity analyses, I again test three additional empirical models, each of 
which includes only one of three congressional control variables—divided government, 
the Senate cloture pivot, and the percentage of seats the president’s party holds in the 
Senate—and provide the results in the Appendix (see Tables A-5 and A-6).  Each of 
these models demonstrates that all three of the variables have significant coefficient 
outcomes when applied in separate models.  More importantly, the results demonstrate 
that the correlation values and levels of significance for my main independent variable—
agency input—remain essentially unchanged across all of the alternative models.  I thus 
conclude that, despite the autocorrelation issue, my policy change model for the Senate, 
which includes both the ideological and majority control measures, provides a valid and 
reliable measure of the relationships under study. 
Presidential Approval in the Senate 
Public opinion of the president may also influence whether legislators will seek 
to make substantive policy changes to a presidential proposal.  Indeed, legislators should 
be less likely to seek or demand changes to a president’s policy proposals when a 
president’s approval ratings are high and if the level of approval increases from the time 
a president proposes an initiative until the time legislators make a final decision on it 
(see Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003). 
In accordance past studies, the predicted probability results for the influence of 
presidential approval on policy changes in the Senate indicate that a change from a half 
standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation above it may decrease the 
likelihood of changes to policy substance by 6.95% (see Table 3).  Given that a half 
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standard deviation represents about a 6.5 percentage point change in approval, this 
means that a total shift of 13 percentage points can increase or decrease the probability 
of substantive policy changes by nearly 7%. 
In addition, I find that the change in public approval from proposal of an 
initiative to its outcome also has a significant influence on the amount of changes made 
to a presidential proposal.  Specifically, the predicted probability results for the Senate 
demonstrate that moving from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
standard deviation above it can decrease the likelihood of a high amount of changes by 
5.33%.  In substantive terms, an increase of about 8 percentage points in approval from 
the time the president proposes an initiative to the time Congress makes a final decision 
can increase or decrease the likelihood of substantive policy changes by over 5% in the 
Senate. 
Temporal Factors and the Budgetary Situation 
 As I previously suggested, timing can be a crucial component that influences 
outcomes.  With respect to changes in policy substance, it may be that the “first mover” 
chamber to address a proposal will need to make fewer changes than the second chamber 
because the second chamber will likely be reacting in accordance with the actions of the 
first.  In addition, it may also be that initiatives proposed at the beginning of a 
president’s term during the honeymoon period may require fewer changes to substance 
than thereafter when legislators are less likely to give the president some leeway.  In 
contrast to my theoretical expectations, I find that the “first mover” chamber is more 
likely to make changes than the second rather than the other way around.  Specifically, 
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the minimum to maximum predicted probability results suggest that being the “first 
mover” chamber increases the likelihood of substantive policy changes by 10.99%.  
Accordingly, it may be that the “first mover” chamber makes more changes than the 
second simply because the first chamber takes care of most of the legislative opposition 
to a bill.  Last, I find that the budgetary situation is also not a major factor in determining 
the amount of changes to policy substance in the Senate. 
Examining Agency Input Influence on Changes in Policy Substance in the House 
Having found strong empirical support in the Senate model demonstrating that 
the substance of a policy initiative serves as an important influence on lowering changes 
in a proposal’s policy substance, I now look at agency input influence on policy change 
in the House of Representatives.  Accordingly, I again test my main hypothesis (H2) that 
a president’s use of agency input in the development of a policy proposal decreases the 
extent of changes in a policy proposal’s substance from the proposal stage to its 
legislative outcome.  As with the previous analyses on success, save for a few slight 
differences concerning the chamber-specific control variables, the results of my analyses 
for measuring change in policy substance in the House are strikingly similar to those of 
the Senate, suggesting that nearly identical dynamics fall into play for both chambers of 
Congress (see Table 4). 
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Table 4  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in the 
House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
  Level of Agency Input -.406*** -4.13 -.3081 .1068 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .005 1.16 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.059 -.22 - - 
  Issue Complexity .717*** 4.37 .2835 .1088 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.113 -1.18 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.231* -1.36 -.0970 .0316 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 4.984** 1.79 .5610 .1708 
Majority Control   - - 
  Divided Government .17 .31 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.034*** -2.52 -.4070 .0904 
  Change in Approval -.029** -1.86 -.4685 .0489 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .116 .48 - - 
  Time in Term -.004 -.67 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 2.35 1.14 - - 
N 466    
LR Chi² 74.97    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1312    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Similar to the results for the Senate model, the empirical findings for the House 
of Representatives provide evidence that the employment of agency input significantly 
decreases the amount of changes legislators make to a presidential initiative under 
legislative scrutiny.  In particular, the predicted probability scores indicate that when 
level of agency input changes from its minimum to maximum value (i.e. from the most 
centralized “1” to the most decentralized “5” level of agency input), the likelihood that 
legislators will make substantive changes to a policy proposal decreases by 30.81% in 
the House (see Table 4).  As for the change from a half standard deviation below the 
mean to a half standard deviation above it, the results show that the likelihood of policy 
changes can decrease by up to 10.68%.  Substantively, this means that substantive policy 
changes are about 11% less likely to happen if presidents develop a policy proposal 
approximating a level “4” amount of agency input than if they employ a level “2” 
amount.  Thus, employing agency input in policy development can play an essential role 
in helping presidents succeed in maintaining the substance of their policy initiatives 
from their proposal stage to their legislative outcomes. 
Presidential Signaling in the House 
As with the results for the Senate, the empirical evidence for the House indicates 
that increased voluminous signaling does not appear to help lower the likelihood that 
legislators will make changes to a policy proposal’s substance (see Table 4).  Again, 
given that the substance of an initiative matters but not the volume in this case, I 
conclude that the core substance of a policy proposal is what determines whether 
legislators will make changes to a legislative bill and that more detail provided through a 
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more voluminous message is more helpful in terms of signaling the president’s 
legislative priorities than in providing the nuanced details of his policy initiatives. 
Issue Dynamics in the House 
 Concerning issue dynamics in the House, it again appears that issue complexity 
and reorganization impact both influence whether legislators are likely to make 
substantive changes to a president’s policy proposal.  Regarding issue complexity, I find 
that more complex issues make it more likely that legislators will seek to make changes 
to the substance of a given proposal (see Table 4).  Specifically, the predicted probability 
results suggest that moving from the least to the most complex types of issues increases 
the likelihood that legislators will make a high amount of changes to a presidential 
proposal by 28.35%.  In addition, given an increase from a half standard deviation below 
the mean to a half standard deviation above it, the likelihood of changes to policy 
substance can increase by up to 10.88%.  Substantively, given that the mean level of 
complexity is 2.042 on a three-point scale with a half standard deviation value of about 
.764, a full standard deviation shift increase raises the likelihood of changes being made 
by about 11% in the House.  As for proposals that constitute a reorganization impact, it 
again appears that they may decrease the likelihood that legislators will make changes to 
a presidential proposal.  Specifically, the predicted probability results from minimum to 
maximum value suggest that an initiative that makes a reorganization impact on an 
agency may decrease the likelihood of a high amount of changes to a proposal by 9.7%. 
Ideology in the House 
As with the results for the Senate model, the House
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increase in the ideological distance between the president and the House increases the 
likelihood of that legislators will make substantive policy changes to a presidential 
proposal from its proposal to its legislative outcome (see Table 4).  Regarding a change 
from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation above it, I 
find that an increase in the ideological distance between the president and the House 
median pivot can increase the likelihood of substantive policy changes by up to 17.08%.  
Given that a half standard deviation represents an increase in ideological distance of 
about .07 in the House (on a -1 to 1 scale), this means that a total ideological distance of 
about .14 between the House median pivot and the president may lead to significant 
changes in policy substance. 
Majority Control in the House 
Regarding the majority control of Congress, the results for the House show an 
insignificant relationship between divided government and legislative success in the 
Senate (see Table 4).  However, as with the corresponding Senate measures, this 
outcome is due mainly to the presence of autocorrelation between the divided 
government and the House median pivot measure.  Accordingly, despite the presence of 
autocorrelation, I again include both variables in the model because their pair-wise 
correlation outcomes are acceptably low and particularly because they are individually 
and theoretically important, with each one capturing distinct measures of the makeup of 
Congress. 
As with the Senate results, I test three additional empirical models for sensitivity 
analyses, each of which includes only one of three congressional control variables—
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divided government, the House median pivot, and the percentage of seats the president’s 
party holds in the House—and provide the results in the Appendix (see Tables A-7 and 
A-8).  Each of these models demonstrates that all three of the variables have significant 
coefficient outcomes when applied in separate models.  As with the Senate results, the 
correlation values and levels of significance for my main independent variable—agency 
input—remain essentially unchanged across all of the alternative models for the House.  
I thus conclude that, despite the autocorrelation issue, my main model for the House 
provides a valid and reliable measure of the relationships under study. 
Presidential Approval in the House 
In accordance with past studies and the Senate model findings, the predicted 
probability results for the influence of presidential approval on policy changes in the 
House indicate that a change from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half 
standard deviation above it may decrease the likelihood of changes to policy substance 
by 9.04% (see Table 4).  Given that a half standard deviation represents about a 6.5 
percentage point change in approval, this means that a total shift of 13 percentage points 
can increase or decrease the probability of substantive policy changes by about 9%. 
In addition, I find that the change in public approval from proposal of an 
initiative to its outcome has a significant influence on the amount of changes made to a 
presidential proposal in the House.  Specifically, the predicted probability results suggest 
that moving from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation 
above it can decrease the likelihood of a high amount of changes by 4.89%.  In 
substantive terms, an increase of about 8 percentage points in approval from the time the 
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president proposes an initiative to the time Congress makes a final decision can increase 
or decrease the likelihood of substantive policy changes by about 5% in the House. 
Temporal Factors and the Budgetary Situation 
 Unlike the Senate results, the “first mover” dummy variable does not have a 
significant influence on proposal policy changes in the House.  In addition, I find that the 
president’s time in term and the budgetary situation are not major influences on whether 
legislators will make substantive policy changes to a presidential proposal. 
Summary 
The empirical evidence that agency input significantly decreases the likelihood 
that legislators will make substantive policy changes to presidential bill proposals 
provides further understanding of how presidents can maximize their policy making 
performance.  Given the findings in this and the previous chapter, it is now evident that 
agency input can help presidents to improve their policy making performance in the 
legislative arena in terms of both outputs and outcomes.  Thus, rather than risk policy 
failure by centralizing the policy development process, presidents stand to benefit more 
in the long-run by putting forth a greater effort on the front-end of the policy making 
process by taking into account the expert bureaucratic advice of agency actors and 
thereby strategically positioning their proposals in a manner that balances their personal 
policy preferences with the advise of agency actors, and the expectations and obstacles 
awaiting them in the legislative branch. 
Regarding the influence of voluminous presidential signaling on changes in 
policy substance, I was surprised to find no relationship between the two.  Generally 
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speaking, it seems that highly voluminous messages are more helpful for signaling to 
Congress the president’s legislative priorities of his policy agenda than in providing the 
nuanced details of his policy initiatives.  Nevertheless, it may be that signaling matters 
only for a certain subset group of agency input, which I will explore in the next chapter 
along with exploring the interactive relationship between agency input and success.  
More specifically, I will next explore at which level of agency input presidents have the 
greatest potential for obtaining congressional support and maintaining the policy 
substance of their proposals and whether an interactive effect with more voluminous 
signaling at such level for each dependent variable holds the key for presidents to 
maximize their policy making performance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXAMINING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCY INPUT AND 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNALING 
The previous two chapters demonstrated conclusively that increased agency input 
in presidential policy development (1) increases the likelihood of policy making success 
and (2) decreases the amount of change in policy substance from an initiative’s formal 
proposal to Congress to its legislative outcome.  In exploring the impact of policy 
substance on presidential proposal messages, I have further examined whether the 
volume of a presidential message also influences policy success and changes in policy 
substance.  My empirical analyses confirm that highly voluminous signaling increases 
the likelihood of policy success, but does not demonstrate an independent effect on 
changes in policy substance. 
What remains is to investigate whether an interactive relationship exists between 
agency input and presidential signaling for influencing policy success and changes in 
policy substance.  Specifically, I argue that because agency input provides presidents 
with sound expert advice, and because Congress views such advice as more legitimate 
than that of the president’s inner circle of advisors, more voluminous signaling at higher 
levels of agency input should increase the likelihood of policy success and lower the 
amount of changes made to policy substance from the proposal stage to passage. 
To test such interactive relationships, I begin by exploring whether agency input 
and presidential signaling have an overall interactive influence on presidential policy 
making success.  I then conduct further tests to verify whether and to what extent an 
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interactive relationship exists across specific levels of agency input.  I then repeat the 
process to test for similar relationships for the models measuring changes in policy 
substance from the proposal stage to passage.  My empirical analyses consist of logit 
pooled cross-sectional regression models measuring the interactive influence of agency 
input and presidential signaling on policy success and changes in presidential policy 
substance.  As with the previous analyses, I measure policy success as “1” = success and 
“0” = no success, and I measure change in policy substance from the proposal stage to 
the legislative outcome as “0” = no change in policy substance, “1” = less than 50% 
changes made, “2” = greater than 50% changes made, and “3” = mostly changed or 
failure.   
In essence, I argue that policy success and changes in a president’s policy 
proposal substance are a function of the level of agency input, presidential signaling, the 
interaction of agency input and presidential signaling, the ideology and majority control 
of Congress, presidential popularity, and a number of other control variables, which may 
be expressed in mathematical form as follows: 
Policy Proposal Outcomes (policy success, change in policy substance) = Β1 + Agency 
Input + Presidential Signaling + Agency Input*Presidential Signaling +  Issue Dynamics + 
Majority Control of Congress + Legislative Ideology + Public Opinion + Temporal Factors + 
Budgetary Situation + εi 
As with the previous chapters, I conduct separate analyses for each chamber to 
control for the differences in the makeup and legislative procedures in each legislative 
body.  Each analysis includes chamber-specific control variables for the number of 
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crosscutting jurisdictions, the chamber pivot, and a dummy variable measuring instances 
where a given chamber is the “first mover” in considering a policy proposal.  For each 
dependent variable, I first conduct an empirical examination of a model for the Senate 
and then follow with a similar empirical examination of a model for the House of 
Representatives. 
Signaling with Agency Input: Testing for an Interactive Effect on Policy Success 
Given the strong evidence from Chapter IV that both agency input and 
presidential signaling have a positive and significant influence on presidential policy 
making success, it follows that higher levels of agency input presented in voluminous 
messages have a particularly potent, positive impact on success.  However, because the 
results of my analyses in Chapter V indicate that only agency input and not presidential 
signaling significantly decreases the amount of policy changes needed for legislative 
passage, the prospect of an interactive relationship between agency input and signaling 
seems less likely.  Nevertheless, I will test for the presence of an interactive relationship 
for both dependent variables and across various levels of agency input. 
There are two main ways to investigate the possibility of an interactive 
relationship between agency input and presidential signaling.  First, it is important to 
establish whether an overall interactive relationship between agency input and 
presidential signaling exists across all levels of agency input.  If so, such results would 
demonstrate that increased signaling increases the likelihood of success of even the most 
centralized policy initiatives and has an even greater influence on initiatives with high 
levels of agency input.  However, if an overall interactive relationship does not exist, it 
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may be that signaling only interacts at a specific level (or levels) of agency input.  In that 
case, further testing at each individual level of agency input will be necessary to 
determine whether and how agency input and signaling interact.  Specifically, testing at 
each individual level includes first testing the subgroup for highly centralized 
presidential policy initiatives of origins within the White House (i.e., level “1”) to 
determine whether voluminous signaling without substantive agency input can still 
increase the likelihood of presidential policymaking success and then doing the same for 
each of the other subgroups.  The other subgroups to test are as follows: as a product of 
centralized outer staff (i.e., level “2”), of mixed-decentralized origins with the White 
House leading development (i.e., level “3”), of mixed-decentralized origins with 
agencies/departments leading policy development (i.e., level “4”), and of highly 
decentralized origins as a product of cabinet departments and/or executive agencies (i.e., 
level “5”). 
Testing for an Overall Interactive Effect on Success in the Senate 
In my initial analysis, I find that agency input and presidential signaling have no 
overall interactive influence on policy success in the Senate (see Table 5 below).  These 
results stand in contrast to the general expectations of hypothesis 3 that more 
voluminous signaling at each level of agency input increases the likelihood of proposal 
passage. 
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Table 5  Overall Agency Input-Presidential Signaling Interactive Influence on 
Presidential Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
Level of Agency Input .335*** 2.97 .3190 .1088 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.003 -.43 - - 
Interactive Dynamic     
Agency Input*Presidential Signaling .003 1.20 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .158 .59 - - 
  Issue Complexity .102 .66 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .094 .67 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.033 -.20 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -9.055*** -2.36 -.7973 .2995 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .238 .40 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .033*** 2.60 .4804 .1104 
  Change in Approval .022* 1.62 .4129 .0479 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.16 -.69 - - 
  Time in Term -.003 -.50 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.382 -.21 - - 
N 464    
LR Chi² 96.60    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1514    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Nevertheless, given the previous evidence that agency input and signaling each 
independently influence presidential success, it may be that an interactive relationship 
does exist, but only under optimal conditions.  Accordingly, I will next test the 
relationship across subgroup levels of agency input. 
Testing Interactions within Agency Input Subgroup Levels on Success in the Senate 
 To test the effect of signaling at each level of agency input, I first disaggregate 
my sample of 466 observations into subgroups for each level of agency input.  I then 
rerun my empirical models for each subgroup to determine the effect (if any) that 
increased, more voluminous signaling can have on success in conjunction with the 
particular level of agency input (see Figure 1).  As I mentioned previously, I first test the 
subgroup for highly centralized presidential policy initiatives of origins within the White 
House (i.e., level “1”) to determine whether voluminous signaling without substantive 
agency input can still increase the likelihood of presidential policymaking success.  I 
then do the same for each of the other subgroups: as a product of centralized outer staff 
(i.e., level “2”), of mixed-decentralized origins with the White House leading 
development (i.e., level “3”), of mixed-decentralized origins with agencies/departments 
leading policy development (i.e., level “4”), and of highly decentralized origins as a 
product of cabinet departments and/or executive agencies (i.e., level “5”). 
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Figure 1  Signaling Influence at each Level of Agency Input (Presidential Policy  
     Success in Congress) 
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  The results of my analyses (Tables 6-10) indicate a significant relationship for 
only the level “4” subgroup of mixed-decentralized origins with agencies/departments 
leading policy development (N = 119; see Table 9).14  On the other hand, I find that 
policy proposals of highly voluminous signaling containing little or no agency input (i.e., 
for subgroup levels “1,” “2,” and “3”) do not increase the likelihood of success, nor do 
proposals developed exclusively at the agency or department level (i.e., subgroup level 
“5”).  To review the results, I first briefly outline the findings for the level “5” subgroup 
and then provide more expansive detail on the significant findings of the level “4” 
subgroup regarding the interactive relationship between signaling and agency input.  
Although the results for subgroups “1,” “2,” and “3” were insignificant, I nevertheless 
provide the table results for comparative purposes (see Tables 6-8 and 10). 
A closer look at the observations for the level “5” subgroup suggest that, despite 
high levels of agency input, the absence of a relationship appears due to the nature of the 
observations for this subgroup, which mostly consist of policy initiatives that are 
apolitical, routinely passed, and periodically renewed without much deliberation.  
Consequently, presidents typically delegate the development of these policy initiatives to 
cabinet departments and/or executive agencies.  Because legislators are unlikely to 
oppose such initiatives, presidents typically submit a brief statement for their proposal 
rather than employ voluminous signaling (e.g., as a Special Message to Congress).  In 
addition, I find that increased approval increases success and increased time in term 
decreases the likelihood of success, as expected. 
                                                 
14
 This subgroups consists of 119 observations that represent approximately 25.5% of the total sample of 
466 observations. 
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Table 6  Level “1” Highly Centralized Inner Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Presidential Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.0009 -.12 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty 2.078** 1.79 .3410 .1900 
  Issue Complexity -.297 -.61 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .135 .39 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .385 .89 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -8.621** -2.15 -.8506 .2109 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government 1.489 1.24 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .037 .92 - - 
  Change in Approval -.024 -.46 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.152 -.22 - - 
  Time in Term .028* 1.51 .5141 .1408 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -11.375** -2.45 -.6978 .1983 
N 81    
LR Chi² 26.49    
Prob>Chi² .0091    
Pseudo R² .2917    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 7  Level “2” Highly Centralized Outer Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Presidential Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.001 -.07 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -1.739** -1.66 -.3483 .1548 
  Issue Complexity 2.075*** 2.38 .7251 .2291 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.292 -.39 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -1.256** -1.66 -.3398 .1815 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -64.10*** -4.92 -1.000 .9136 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government 6.759*** 3.21 .7826 .5645 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .099* 1.49 .8043 .2308 
  Change in Approval .08* 1.47 .8944 .1652 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -3.942*** -2.48 -.4734 .3234 
  Time in Term .015 .69 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -12.501* -1.53 -.7383 .2047 
N 61    
LR Chi² 42.29    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .5646    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 8  Level “3” Mixed-Centralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .003 .68 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .172 .35 - - 
  Issue Complexity -.019 -.07 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.114 -.60 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.907*** -2.96 -.4246 .1540 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -6.654*** -2.78 -.0605 .0304 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.2538 -.46 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .0157 .76 - - 
  Change in Approval -.0198 -.66 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.1251 -.29 - - 
  Time in Term -.0017 -.15 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.66 -.60 - - 
N 123    
LR Chi² 27.85    
Prob>Chi² .0058    
Pseudo R² .1799    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 9  Level “4” Mixed-decentralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .043** 1.89 .4141 .1777 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.91** -1.74 -.1578 .0810 
  Issue Complexity .075 .24 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .28 1.14 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .528* 1.45 .1527 .0572 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -5.071*** -2.51 -.5791 .1187 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -1.198** -1.68 -.2005 .1053 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .015 .64 - - 
  Change in Approval -.033 -.91 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.551 -1.09 - - 
  Time in Term -.011 -1.09 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit .155 .06 - - 
N 119    
LR Chi² 23.14    
Prob>Chi² .0265    
Pseudo R² .1691    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 10  Level “5” Highly Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .002 .21 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.054 -.10 - - 
  Issue Complexity .404 1.06 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .737* 1.42 .4523 .0865 
  Reorganization Impact .128 .31 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot -1.125 -.45 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .416 .65 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .021 .91 - - 
  Change in Approval .081** 1.97 .7501 .1282 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .635 .97 - - 
  Time in Term -.018* -1.61 -.3492 .0983 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.658 -.22 - - 
N 82    
LR Chi² 14.01    
Prob>Chi² .3003    
Pseudo R² .1321    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Subgroup (Senate Success) 
In my analysis for the level “4” subgroup in the Senate, I find partial support for 
my hypothesis (H3) that more voluminous signaling at each level of agency input 
increases the likelihood of proposal passage.  According to Table 9, there is a significant 
and positive relationship between highly voluminous signaling of subgroup level “4” 
policy initiatives and the likelihood of presidential policy success in the Senate.  
Specifically, the predicted probability results suggest that when presidential signaling for 
subgroup level “4” initiatives changes from its minimum to maximum value, the 
likelihood of presidential policy success in Congress increases by 41.41% in the Senate.   
The findings for the level “4” subgroup, along with the null findings for the other 
subgroups, indicate that although increased agency input and more voluminous signaling 
do not have an overall interactive influence on success, it is specifically when highly 
voluminous signaling occurs in conjunction with a high level of agency input consisting 
of mixed-decentralized origins with agencies/departments leading policy development 
that the likelihood of success in the Senate increases significantly.  These findings hold 
important implications regarding presidential policy making strategies and presidential 
performance.   
The key to understanding the importance of these findings centers on why the 
level “4” subgroup—and not the others—is most effective in helping the president 
succeed in the legislative arena and why greater signaling at such level provides the most 
potent form of influence over the policy making process.  A close look at the 
observations for each of the subgroups shows a wide variety of initiatives with the 
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exception, as noted above, that the level “5” subgroup of highly decentralized initiatives 
includes a large number of policy initiatives that are apolitical, routinely passed, and 
periodically renewed with less deliberation.  For the other subgroups, although initiatives 
nearer to the level “1” category tend towards newer and more social issues and 
initiatives nearer to the level “4” category tend towards issues that are more complex in 
nature, the range is very mixed overall across levels.  Generally speaking, each category 
from levels “1” to “4” includes observations of initiatives that apply to a wide range of 
issue dynamics concerning saliency, complexity, crosscutting jurisdictions, and so on.   
Given the generally well distributed variety of initiatives, it makes sense that it is 
the approach to policy development itself that most influences the manner that 
legislators interpret a policy proposal and, in turn, whether or not such a proposal passes 
into law.  Thus, a president’s approach to policy development is the core determinant for 
affecting the policy arena and is particularly potent when proposed as a voluminous 
message to the Congress.  The message that legislators appear to receive from such 
proposals is that the president values objective, expert advice required for developing 
legitimate policy solutions, that agency actors are willing and able to implement such 
proposals, and that voluminous signaling indicates such proposals are a major priority of 
the policy agenda.  Although such an observation seems obvious in hindsight, it 
represents a clear contrast to mainstream ideas about presidential policy making. 
Last, in using the level “4” approach, presidents benefit from a development style 
that encourages legislative and agency consultation, which provides presidents that 
opportunity to better gauge the legislative obstacles they face and to make any necessary 
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adjustments, on their own terms, in the substance of a given initiative prior to its formal 
proposal in order to help ensure its successful passage and eventual implementation.  
The other development approaches, particularly the level “1” and “2” approaches, do not 
provide the same opportunity to maximize the utility of preparing an initiative during the 
development stage for formal proposal to Congress and are thus more likely to be 
subject to legislative scrutiny that may drastically alter or dismiss the president’s 
intended policy objectives. 
In sum, because agency input provides presidents with sound expert advice, and 
because Congress views such advice as more legitimate, more voluminous signaling of a 
proposal that includes agency input likewise increases the overall clarity of the proposal 
and thereby further aid its passage into law.  This insight represents a major new 
contribution to mainstream presidential scholarship.  Having outlined the significance 
and implications for the findings on the interactive relationship for the level “4” 
subgroup, I will conclude this section with a review of the remaining findings for the 
other coefficients.   
Control Variable Findings for Success in the Senate (Level “4”) 
 With regards to the influence that issue dynamics has on policy success in the 
Senate for the level “4” subgroup of agency input, the findings provide evidence of 
nuanced relationships not seen in the general models tested in Chapter IV.  For instance, 
I find that issue novelty has a significant and negative influence on policy success for the 
level “4” subgroup of observations, with the predicted probability scores indicating a 
decrease in the likelihood of success in the Senate of 15.78%.  This result makes sense 
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because a high level of agency input may not be as helpful to a president when dealing 
with an issue that is new and for which agencies have little or no institutional knowledge 
that is useful for the president to adopt in developing a policy proposal. 
Regarding reorganization initiatives, I find that proposals constituting the 
reorganization of an agency appear to increase the likelihood of policy success in the 
Senate by about 15.27% from minimum to maximum value, which contrasts my general 
theoretical expectations that proposals constituting reorganization of one or more 
agencies should result in greater congressional opposition.  However, it may be the case 
that this subgroup category is well suited for reorganization proposals given the high 
level of input the agencies themselves have in determining the reorganization plan.  
Indeed, members of Congress are less likely to oppose a reorganization presidential 
initiative if the agencies approve of and recommend the proposed changes. 
 Inline with my findings in previous chapters, I find that a greater ideological 
distance between the president and the Senate cloture pivot decreases the likelihood of 
policy success.  Specifically, the results indicate that a change from a half standard 
deviation below the mean value to a half standard deviation above it can decrease the 
likelihood of success by about 11.87%.   
Regarding majority control, the results indicate that the presence of divided 
government significantly decreases the likelihood of success by about 20.05%.  This 
result is consistent with the literature and all my previous analyses from Chapter IV.  
Thus, although higher levels of agency input may squelch ideological differences, 
legislators in a divided government scenario may nevertheless fall back on their party 
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loyalties in voting against a bill proposed by a president of the opposing party. 
Testing Interactions within Agency Input Subgroup Levels on Success in the House 
 As with the analysis for success in the Senate, an overall interactive relationship 
between agency input and signaling does not exist for influencing success in the House.  
Nevertheless, it may be that an interactive relationship does exist at a specific level (or 
levels) of agency input (see Table 11). 
To test across levels of agency input, I again disaggregate my sample of 466 
observations into subgroups for each level of agency input and then rerun my empirical 
models for each subgroup to determine whether increased, more voluminous signaling 
increases success at each level (see Tables 12-16).  As with the results for the Senate, I 
find an interactive relationship only for the level “4” subgroup of agency input (see 
Table 15). 
To review the results, I first briefly outline the findings for the level “5” 
subgroup and then provide more expansive detail on the significant findings of the level 
“4” subgroup regarding the interactive relationship between signaling and agency input.  
Although the results for subgroups “1,” “2,” and “3” were insignificant, I nevertheless 
provide the table results for comparative purposes. 
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Table 11  Overall Agency Input-Presidential Signaling Interactive Influence on 
Presidential Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
Level of Agency Input .336*** 2.98 .3202 .1092 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.003 -.40 - - 
Interactive Dynamic     
Agency Input*Presidential Signaling .003 1.26 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .156 .58 - - 
  Issue Complexity .085 .56 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .166* 1.64 .3401 .0484 
  Reorganization Impact -.053 -.33 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -6.875*** -2.34 -.7500 .2860 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .001 .00 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .035*** 2.69 .4976 .1151 
  Change in Approval .028** 1.91 .4896 .0587 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .170 .74 - - 
  Time in Term -.005 -.82 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.709 -.91 - - 
N 464    
LR Chi² 99.61    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1562    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 12  Level “1” Highly Centralized Inner Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Presidential Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.001 -.16 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty 2.904** 2.28 .4532 .2649 
  Issue Complexity -.252 -.57 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .1 .39 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .546* 1.46 .2309 .0783 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -2.908 .33 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .256 -1.13 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .051 1.28 - - 
  Change in Approval -.001 -.03 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .018 .03 - - 
  Time in Term .029* 1.5 .5176 .1420 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -11.395** -2.22 -.7000 .1994 
N 81    
LR Chi² 21.91    
Prob>Chi² .0385    
Pseudo R² .2451    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 13  Level “2” Highly Centralized Outer Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Presidential Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .007 .38 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty 2.873*** 2.53 .4392 .2610 
  Issue Complexity .962** 1.86 .3770 .1443 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .431 .90 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.199 -.36 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -7.865** -1.89 -.7987 .2410 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.01 -.01 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .005 .14 - - 
  Change in Approval .017 .37 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber 1.06* 1.30 .1776 .0909 
  Time in Term .0004 .03 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 8.067 1.25 - - 
N 61    
LR Chi² 24.30    
Prob>Chi² .0185    
Pseudo R² .2926    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 14  Level “3” Mixed-Centralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .006 1.21 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .64* 1.29 .1555 .0722 
  Issue Complexity -.02 -.07 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .166 .83 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.867*** -3.07 -.4080 .1483 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -3.464** -2.13 -.4521 .1437 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.605 -1.14 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .029* 1.49 .3744 .0980 
  Change in Approval -.002 -.08 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .244 .57 - - 
  Time in Term .001 .13 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.929 -.64 - - 
N 123    
LR Chi² 26.95    
Prob>Chi² .0078    
Pseudo R² .1561    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 15  Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .048** 2.04 .4196 .1898 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.899** -1.74 -.1495 .0767 
  Issue Complexity -.067 -.21 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .643*** 2.39 .4510 .1624 
  Reorganization Impact .494 1.16 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -2.894** -1.88 -.3021 .0839 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.811 -1.19 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .016 .72 - - 
  Change in Approval -.044 -1.08 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .603 1.12 - - 
  Time in Term -.011 -1.21 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 1.598 .63 - - 
N 119    
LR Chi² 17.11    
Prob>Chi² .1456    
Pseudo R² .1856    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 16  Level “5” Highly Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Presidential 
Success in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .002 .17 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .012 .02 - - 
  Issue Complexity .458 1.24 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .311 1.16 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .223 .56 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot -1.576 .59 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .349 -.79 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval .021 .91 - - 
  Change in Approval .083** 1.89 .7590 .1312 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.642 -1.01 - - 
  Time in Term -.014* -1.31 -.2899 .0817 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.651 -.46 - - 
N 82    
LR Chi² 13.66    
Prob>Chi² .3228    
Pseudo R² .1283    
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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  For the subset group of the most highly decentralized initiatives (i.e., level “5”) 
that are a product of cabinet departments or executive agencies, I find no evidence of an 
interactive relationship between increased signaling and agency input.  A closer look at 
the observations for the level “5” subgroup suggest that, despite high levels of agency 
input, the absence of a relationship appears mostly due to the nature of the observations 
for this subgroup, which mostly consist of policy initiatives that are apolitical, routinely 
passed, and periodically renewed without much deliberation.  Consequently, presidents 
typically delegate the development of these policy initiatives to cabinet departments 
and/or executive agencies.  Because legislators are unlikely to oppose such initiatives, 
presidents typically submit a brief statement for their proposal rather than employ 
voluminous signaling (e.g., as a Special Message to Congress).  Once again as with the 
Senate results, I also find that increased approval increases success and increased time in 
term decreases the likelihood of success, as expected. 
Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Subgroup (House Success) 
Having briefly described the results for the subgroups lacking a significant 
interactive relationship, I will now focus on the significant findings for the level “4” 
subgroup.  Specifically, the predicted probability results in Table 15 suggest that when 
presidential signaling for subgroup level “4” initiatives changes from its minimum to 
maximum value, the likelihood of presidential policy success in Congress increases by 
41.96% in the House. 
As with the results for the Senate, although increased agency input and more 
voluminous signaling do not have an overall interactive influence on success, it is 
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specifically when highly voluminous signaling occurs in conjunction with a high level of 
agency input consisting of mixed-decentralized origins with agencies/departments 
leading policy development that the likelihood of success in the House increases.  
Accordingly, presidents should place a greater focus on their managerial strategies for 
developing and proposing their policy initiatives because doing so provides presidents 
with significant opportunities for increasing their likelihood of success in policy making. 
As I stated previously, the variety of initiatives across subgroup levels is 
generally well distributed, which makes sense since it is the approach to policy 
development itself that most influences the manner that legislators interpret a policy 
proposal and, in turn, whether or not such a proposal passes into law.  Thus, a 
president’s approach to policy development is the core determinant for affecting the 
policy arena and is particularly potent when proposed as a voluminous message to the 
Congress.  The message that legislators appear to receive from such proposals is that the 
president values objective, expert advice required for developing legitimate policy 
solutions, that agency actors are willing and able to implement such proposals, and that 
voluminous signaling indicates such proposals are a major priority of the policy agenda.  
Although such an observation seems obvious in hindsight, it represents a clear contrast 
to mainstream ideas about presidential policy making. 
Rather than simply centralizing the process to lower front-end costs and then 
relying mostly strategies such as going public to pass their initiatives into law, presidents 
should instead put forth a greater effort at the development stage to prepare their 
initiatives in a manner that improves their substance and bureaucratic legitimacy.  More 
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specifically, presidents must prepare their initiatives in a way that allows them to 
interact—through consultation and cooperation—with agency actors and legislators so 
that they can better gauge the political landscape and the obstacles it presents to 
successful policy passage.  Thus, as I stated previously, presidents should take advantage 
of the opportunity to revise and improve their initiatives in a manner that will help 
maximize their likelihood of success once they deliver their proposals to the Congress.  
Having outlined the significance and implications for the findings on the 
interactive relationship for the level “4” subgroup, I will conclude this section with a 
review of the remaining findings for the other coefficients.   
Control Variable Findings for Success in the House (Level “4”) 
 Similar to the results for the Senate, I again find that issue novelty has a negative 
and significant influence on presidential policy success in the House as well.  In 
particular, the predicted probability results suggest that the presence of a new issue can 
decrease the likelihood of success by up to 14.95% in the House, which supports 
hypothesis 5.  As I mention above, such a result makes sense since high levels of agency 
input are less likely to be useful regarding issues that are new and for which agencies 
have little institutional knowledge from which to draw reliable advice on. 
 Another interesting finding regarding issue dynamics is the positive influence 
that the number of crosscutting jurisdictions has on success in the House.  Similar to the 
results from Chapter IV on the House, it appears that the greater number of 
congressional committees taking part in the House for a given issue, the greater the 
likelihood of legislative passage.  In particular, I find that an increase in the number of 
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crosscutting moving from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard 
deviation above it can decrease the amount of changes to policy substance by up to 
16.24%.  More substantively, the mean number of crosscutting jurisdictions equals 1.64 
with a half standard deviation value of about 1.2 such that movement from 1 to 3 
crosscutting jurisdictions can decrease the amount of changes to policy substance by 
about 16%.  Although this contradicts my general expectation that more crosscutting 
jurisdictions can lead to turf warfare between committees, it may be that the high level 
of agency input for this subgroup provides a more cooperative environment where 
committees can work together by focusing on the expert advice of agency actors to find 
common ground for passing a presidential initiative into law. 
Ideology Influence on Success in the House (Level “4”) 
 As with the results for the Senate, I find that increases in ideological distance 
between the president and the House median pivot appear to decrease the likelihood of 
success in the House.  Specifically, the results indicate that a change from a half standard 
deviation below the mean value to a half standard deviation above it can decrease the 
likelihood of success in the House by about 8.39%. 
Signaling with Agency Input: Testing for an Interactive Effect on Changes in Policy 
Substance 
 Having thoroughly tested the models for success in Congress, I now apply the 
similar analyses for my models concerning changes in policy substance from proposal to 
passage.  I argue that because agency involvement at the policy development stage along 
with voluminous signaling increases the likelihood of policy success, it may also be the 
   109    
 
 
case that voluminous signaling in conjunction with agency input will lower the 
likelihood that legislators will significantly alter the substance of a given presidential 
policy initiative once the president formally proposes it.  In other words, if presidents 
employ agency input for the development of a policy proposal, it is more likely that the 
consultation occurring during the development phase have already taken into account the 
preferences and suggestions of legislators (particularly key committee members) and 
thus decrease the need for further changes in the substance of the policy proposal (see 
Rudalevige 2002, 117). 
In accordance with the models measuring success, I first conduct analyses that 
test for an overall interactive relationship between agency input and signaling using the 
full dataset sample of 466 observations.  I find no evidence that agency input and 
presidential signaling have an overall interactive influence on changes in policy 
substance in either the Senate or the House (see Tables 17 and 18). 
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Table 17  Overall Agency Input-Presidential Signaling Interactive Influence on 
Change in Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
Level of Agency Input -.442*** -3.60 -.3514 .1229 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .005 .45 - - 
Interactive Dynamic     
Agency Input*Presidential Signaling -.0004 -.12 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.045 -.17 - - 
  Issue Complexity .516*** 3.25 .2163 .0830 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.113 -.81 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.274* -1.62 -.1217 .0397 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 5.739* 1.48 .6757 .1664 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.205 -.34 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.025** -1.95 -.3240 .0711 
  Change in Approval -.03** -2.02 -.5095 .0548 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .558** 2.22 .1117 .0542 
  Time in Term .003 .48 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.869 -.44 - - 
N 464    
LR Chi² 73.63    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1258    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 18  Overall Agency Input-Presidential Signaling Interactive Influence on 
Change in Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Policy Development     
Level of Agency Input -.425*** -3.38 -.3223 .1120 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .002 .18 - - 
Interactive Dynamic     
Agency Input*Presidential Signaling .001 .28 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.046 -.17 - - 
  Issue Complexity .712*** 4.34 .2826 .1084 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.112 -1.17 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.223* -1.32 -.0940 .0307 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 4.887* 1.75 .5531 .1684 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .185 .33 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.034** -2.54 - - 
  Change in Approval -.029* -1.88 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .114 .47 - - 
  Time in Term -.004 -.66 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 2.385 1.15 - - 
N 464    
LR Chi² 74.79    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² .1312    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Figure 2  Signaling Influence at Each Level of Agency Input (Change in Policy  
                Substance) 
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  The finding that agency input and presidential signaling have no overall 
interactive influence on changes in policy substance contradicts my fourth hypothesis, 
which states that more voluminous signaling at each level of agency input decreases the 
extent of changes in policy proposal substance from the proposal stages to the legislative 
outcome.  Despite the contradiction, the finding is not altogether surprising given the 
fact that the results for signaling in Chapter V were also insignificant.  As with the 
interactive relationships tested for the models measuring success, an interactive 
relationship may nevertheless exist to influence changes in policy substance from 
proposal to passage, but only under optimal conditions.  Accordingly, I test the 
relationship across subgroup levels of agency input in each chamber to explore this 
possibility (see Figure 2). 
Testing Interactions within Agency Input Subgroup Levels on Changes in Policy 
Substance in the Senate 
In testing for an interactive relationship between agency input and presidential 
signaling across agency input subgroups, I find that presidential signaling interacts with 
agency input only in the Senate and find no reliable empirical evidence that an 
interaction occurs in the House.  Specifically, my analyses measuring interactive 
influences on changes in policy substance show that the level “3” and “4” subgroups in 
the Senate have significant interactive relationships, but indicate no interactive 
relationships across subgroups in the House.  Although the findings indicate no 
interactive effect on changes in policy substance in the House, the significant findings 
for the Senate provide further evidence that the employment of highly voluminous 
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signaling for presidential policy initiatives of mixed-decentralized origins represents the 
most potent and influential policymaking strategy that presidents can employ to push 
their policy agendas through Congress. 
Before delving into the specifics of the interactive findings in the Senate (see 
Tables 19-23), I first briefly review the findings for the Senate level “5” subgroup 
analysis.  I then focus in detail on the Senate level “3” and “4” subgroup findings and 
their implications, and thereafter provide the table results for the null findings of the 
House analyses. 
Regarding the level “5” subgroup analysis (see Table 23), I again find no 
evidence of an interactive relationship between increased signaling and agency input for 
the subset group of the most highly decentralized initiatives (i.e., level “5”) that are a 
product of cabinet departments or executive agencies.  As with the findings for the 
success models, the absence of a relationship appears due to the nature of the 
observations for this subgroup, which mostly consist of policy initiatives that are 
apolitical, routinely passed, and periodically renewed without much deliberation.  
Consequently, presidents typically delegate the development of these policy initiatives to 
cabinet departments and/or executive agencies.  Because legislators are unlikely to 
oppose such initiatives, presidents typically submit a brief statement for their proposal 
rather than employ voluminous signaling (e.g., as a Special Message to Congress). 
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Table 19  Level “1” Highly Centralized Inner Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Changes in Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .006 .49 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .211 .18 - - 
  Issue Complexity .916 1.25 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.833*** -2.36 -.4772 .0617 
  Reorganization Impact -.695* -1.34 -.1507 .0418 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 17.525*** 3.13 .9878 .1998 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -1.443 -.97 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.075 -1.24 - - 
  Change in Approval -.127** -2.54 -.5504 .0945 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber 1.193 1.22 - - 
  Time in Term .016 .68 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.692 -.10 - - 
N 81    
LR Chi² 26.41    
Prob>Chi² .0094    
Pseudo R² .4296    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 20  Level “2” Highly Centralized Outer Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Changes in Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -4.429 -.00 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty 383.7379 .02 - - 
  Issue Complexity -70.845 -.01 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions 39.709 .01 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -41.932 -.00 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 8054.301 .02 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -752.178 -.01 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -13.587 -.00 - - 
  Change in Approval -13.328 -.00 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber - - - - 
  Time in Term 4.189 .00 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 1419.613 .00 - - 
N 44    
LR Chi² 55.04    
Prob>Chi² .0000    
Pseudo R² 1.0000    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
 
                                                                                                                
 
 
Table 21  Level “3” Mixed-Centralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .011** 1.76 .2267 .0733 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .556 .93 - - 
  Issue Complexity 1.003*** 2.70 .3509 .1158 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.068 -.30 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .123 .32 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 2.11 .92 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government 1.122* 1.53 .1750 .0858 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.005 -.19 - - 
  Change in Approval .004 .11 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber 1.011** 1.73 .1421 .0746 
  Time in Term .003 .23 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -3.831 -1.25 - - 
N 123    
LR Chi² 25.90    
Prob>Chi² .0111    
Pseudo R² .2333    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 22  Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Presidential Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.014* -1.47 -.4308 .0820 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .078 .19 - - 
  Issue Complexity .563** 1.82 .2742 .0972 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.211 -.81 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .249 .70 - - 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 4.159** 2.31 .5148 .1347 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .552 1.11 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.009 -.51 - - 
  Change in Approval .02 .81 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .477 1.06 - - 
  Time in Term .009 .89 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -.899 -.36 - - 
N 119    
LR Chi² 14.48    
Prob>Chi² .2713    
Pseudo R² .0794    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 23  Level “5” Highly Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Policy Substance in the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the Senate 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .008 .67 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .546 .96 - - 
  Issue Complexity .151 .41 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .276 .53 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.86** -1.91 -.3938 .1201 
Ideology     
  Senate Cloture Pivot 3.66* -.62 .4879 .1373 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government -.39 1.56 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.006 -.31 - - 
  Change in Approval -.05* -1.41 -.5210 .0911 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.423 -.67 - - 
  Time in Term .01 .89 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 4.18* 1.33 .3778 .0990 
N 82    
LR Chi² 9.57    
Prob>Chi² .6535    
Pseudo R² .1094    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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  In accordance with previous findings, I find that greater ideological distance 
between the Senate cloture pivot and the president and a deterioration of the budget 
situation amid increases in the deficit each increase the likelihood of changes in policy 
substance.  On the other hand, I find that a reorganization impact at the most 
decentralized level, as well as a positive change in approval over time decreases the 
likelihood of changes to policy substance. 
Having briefly described the findings for the subgroups that did not have reliable 
empirical evidence of an interactive relationship between agency input and presidential 
signaling, I next provide more detail on the findings for the level “3” and level “4” 
subgroups in the Senate. 
Level “3” Mixed-Centralized Agency Input Subgroup (Senate Change) 
In my analysis of the Senate for the level “3” subgroup (see Table 21 above), I 
find partial support for my hypothesis (H4) that more voluminous signaling at each level 
of agency input decreases the amount of changes in policy substance.  According to 
Table 21, there is a significant and positive relationship between highly voluminous 
signaling of subgroup level “3” policy initiatives and decreases in the amount of changes 
to policy substance in the Senate.  Specifically, the predicted probability results suggest 
that when presidential signaling for subgroup level “3” initiatives changes from its 
minimum to maximum value, the likelihood of changes to the policy substance of a 
presidential proposal in the Senate decreases by 22.67%. 
Indeed, because agency involvement at the policy development stage provides 
opportunities for cooperation between the president, legislators, and agency actors, it 
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makes sense that more voluminous signaling in conjunction with agency input lowers 
the likelihood that legislators will look to significantly alter the substance of a given 
presidential policy initiative once the president formally proposes it.  Thus, if presidents 
employ agency input for the development of a policy proposal, it is more likely that the 
consultation occurring during the development phase has already taken into account the 
preferences and suggestions of legislators (particularly key committee members) and 
thus decreased the need for further changes in the substance of the policy proposal (see 
Rudalevige 2002, 117).   
In sum, presidents are wise to prepare their initiatives in a way that allows them 
to interact—through consultation and cooperation—with agency actors and legislators so 
that they can better gauge the political landscape and the obstacles it presents to 
successful policy passage.  As I noted with the previous analyses, presidents should take 
advantage of the opportunity to revise and improve their initiatives in a manner that will 
help maximize their likelihood of success once they deliver their proposals to the 
Congress.  In accordance with the findings for the Senate regarding changes in policy 
substance, putting forth a greater effort to prepare presidential initiatives at the 
development stage is well worth the higher up-front managerial costs given that it will 
likely increase the likelihood that legislators will not significantly alter or reject the 
major components of their initiatives. 
Control Variable Results for Changes in Policy Substance in the Senate (Level “3”) 
 Concerning the impact that issue dynamics have on changes in policy substance 
in the Senate for the level “3” subgroup of agency input, I find that issue complexity has 
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a significant influence in increasing the amount of changes in policy substance.  
Specifically, the predicted probability scores indicate that the likelihood of changes in 
policy substance in the Senate may increase by about 11.58% moving from a half 
standard deviation below the mean to a half standard deviation above it.  Substantively, 
given that the mean level of complexity is 2.042 on a three-point scale with a half 
standard deviation value of about .764, a full deviation shift up can increase the 
likelihood of changes to policy substance by nearly 12%.  Indeed, complex proposals are 
harder for the president to pass through Congress because they are likely to lead to 
competing sources of bureaucratic advice (see Rudalevige 2002, 129). 
 With regards to majority control, the results indicate that the presence of divided 
government significantly increases the likelihood of changes to policy substance by 
approximately 17.05%.  This result is consistent with the literature and all my previous 
analyses from Chapter V.  Thus, although higher levels of agency input may squelch 
ideological differences, legislators in a divided government scenario may nevertheless 
fall back on their party loyalties in wanted to revise or recompose a bill proposed by a 
president of the opposing party. 
 Last for the level “3” subgroup, I find that cases where the Senate acts as the 
“first mover” chamber increases the likelihood that legislators will make changes to the 
substance of a presidential proposal.  In particular, the predicted probability results 
suggest that acting as the first mover chamber increases the likelihood of changes to 
policy substance by about 14.21%. 
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Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Subgroup (Senate Change) 
As with the analysis of the Senate for the level “3” subgroup, the findings for the 
level “4” subgroup provide further support for my hypothesis (H4) that more 
voluminous signaling at each level of agency input decreases the amount of changes in 
policy substance.  According to Table 22, there is a significant and positive relationship 
between highly voluminous signaling of subgroup level “4” policy initiatives and 
decreases in the amount of changes to policy substance in the Senate.  Specifically, the 
predicted probability results suggest that when presidential signaling for subgroup level 
“4” initiatives changes from its minimum to maximum value, the likelihood of changes 
to the policy substance of a presidential proposal in the Senate decreases by 43.08%.   
These results indicate that although increased agency input and more voluminous 
signaling do not have an overall interactive influence on changes in policy substance, it 
is specifically when highly voluminous signaling occurs in conjunction with a high level 
of agency input consisting of mixed-decentralized origins with agencies/departments 
leading policy development that the likelihood of changes in policy substance in the 
Senate decreases significantly.   
As with the Senate results for success, such findings demonstrate that presidents 
are able to keep their policy proposals in their original form when developing them using 
the advice of agency actors.  The conundrum, however, is that presidents may face 
instances where the available agency advice significantly contradicts their own policy 
preferences.  In such cases, presidents must choose between maximizing preferences at 
the risk of failure or compromising heavily for the sake of success.  Of course, as a third 
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alternative, presidents may also attempt some sort of trade-off that keeps the general 
scope of the president’s preferences in tact while also taking advantage of agency 
expertise when it comes to the nuances of the policy details in a given proposal.  These 
considerations and the manner that presidents can begin to outline a theoretical 
framework for better understanding the role of presidential-agency compatibility in the 
policy making process are described in more detail in the future studies section of the 
concluding chapter. 
Control Variable Results for Changes in Policy Substance in the Senate (Level “4”) 
 With regards to the impact that issue dynamics have on changes in policy 
substance in the Senate for the level “4” subgroup of agency input, I find that only issue 
complexity has a significant influence.  Specifically, the predicted probability scores 
indicate that the likelihood of changes in policy substance in the Senate may increase by 
about 9.72% moving from a half standard deviation below the mean to a half standard 
deviation above it.  Substantively, given that the mean level of complexity is 2.042 on a 
three-point scale with a half standard deviation value of about .764, a full deviation shift 
up can increase the likelihood of changes to policy substance by nearly 10%.  Indeed, 
complex proposals are harder for the president to pass through Congress because they 
are likely to lead to competing sources of bureaucratic advice (see Rudalevige 2002, 
129). 
 Similar to my findings in previous chapters, I find that increases in ideological 
distance between the president and the Senate cloture pivot appear to increase the 
amount of changes in policy substance from proposal to legislative passage.  
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Specifically, the results indicate that a change from a half standard deviation below the 
mean value to a half standard deviation above it can increase the likelihood of changes to 
policy substance by about 13.47%. 
Testing Interactions within Agency Input Subgroup Levels on Changes in Policy 
Substance in the House 
 Unlike all the previous groups of analyses in this chapter, the findings for 
measuring changes in policy substance in the House suggest that no interactive 
relationship between agency input and signaling exists.  Given that agency input and 
signaling together do provide increased levels of policy success, the null findings here 
demonstrate that the interactive influence on changes in policy substance are simply not 
as prevalent in the House as they are in the Senate.  Although the results for all 
subgroups in the House were insignificant, I provide the table results for comparative 
purposes (see Tables 24-28). 
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Table 24  Level “1” Highly Centralized Inner Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit 
Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .012 .88 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -1.308* -1.46 -.1034 .0558 
  Issue Complexity .27 .43 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions .748** 1.76 .2759 .0893 
  Reorganization Impact -1.284*** -2.63 -.3755 .0859 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 2.442 1.00 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .965 .96 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.033 -.59 - - 
  Change in Approval -.087** -1.71 -.3714 .0700 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.37 -.42 - - 
  Time in Term .007 .45 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 3.07 .43 - - 
N 81    
LR Chi² 21.46    
Prob>Chi² .0440    
Pseudo R² .3199    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 25  Level “2” Highly Centralized Outer Staff Agency Input Influence on 
Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit 
Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.048** -1.81 . . 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty - - - - 
  Issue Complexity -.596 -.53 - - 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.719 -.89 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.826 -.75 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 11.688* .37 . . 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .663 1.51 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.038 -.76 - - 
  Change in Approval -.021 -.48 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -2.382* -1.45 . . 
  Time in Term -.001 -.11 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 7.219 .58 - - 
N 39    
LR Chi² 27.90    
Prob>Chi² .0034    
Pseudo R² .4062    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 26  Level “3” Mixed-Centralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Presidential Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .011 1.21 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty -.44 -.77 - - 
  Issue Complexity 1.01*** 2.86 .3303 .1065 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.162 -.81 - - 
  Reorganization Impact .114 .34 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 2.865* 1.60 .2456 .0693 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .563 .89 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.014 -.58 - - 
  Change in Approval -.006 -.14 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber -.003 -.01 - - 
  Time in Term -.003 -.28 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit -1.475 -.49 - - 
N 123    
LR Chi² 21.53    
Prob>Chi² .0432    
Pseudo R² .1866    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 27  Level “4” Mixed-Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Presidential Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume -.007 -.78 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .214  .49 - - 
  Issue Complexity .991** 2.97 .4544 .1655 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.434** -1.88 -.7123 .1542 
  Reorganization Impact .251 .71 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 1.245 .85 - - 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .274 .57 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.031** -1.76 -.4329 .1037 
  Change in Approval .023 .81 - - 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber .153 .33 - - 
  Time in Term .002 .23 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit .897 .33 - - 
N 119    
LR Chi² 17.86    
Prob>Chi² .1199    
Pseudo R² .1162    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table 28  Level “5” Highly Decentralized Agency Input Influence on Changes in 
Presidential Policy Substance in the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Change in the House 
Variables Coefficients Z-Score Min->Max -+sd/2 
Presidential Signaling     
  Proposal Volume .006 .48 - - 
Issue Dynamics     
  Issue Novelty .953** 1.75 .2263 .1147 
  Issue Complexity .55* 1.56 .2611 .1020 
  Crosscutting Jurisdictions -.271 -1.02 - - 
  Reorganization Impact -.554 -1.23 - - 
Ideology     
  House Median Pivot 3.193* .96 .4280 .1438 
Majority Control     
  Divided Government .595 1.57 - - 
Public Opinion     
  Presidential Approval -.003* -1.32 -.4047 .1142 
  Change in Approval -.069** -1.85 -.6389 .1224 
Temporal Factors     
  “First Mover” Chamber 1.458** 2.19 .3492 .1504 
  Time in Term -.007 -.75 - - 
Budgetary Situation     
  Deficit 7.128** 1.88 -.1684 .0488 
N 82    
LR Chi² 21.03    
Prob>Chi² .0499    
Pseudo R² .1717    
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Summary 
The interactive relationship between agency input and presidential signaling and 
its influence of policy success and changes in policy substance is more complex and 
nuanced than I hypothesized.  Indeed, of all the models testing for an overall interactive 
effect, none provided any significant findings of such a relationship.  Instead, I find that 
it is only for the specific subgroup level “4” of agency input (i.e. of mixed-decentralized 
origins with agencies/departments leading policy development) that a significant 
interactive effect exists.  More specifically, I find that more voluminous signaling at 
such high level of agency input significantly increases the likelihood of policy success in 
both chambers, but only significantly decreases the amount of changes to policy 
substance in the Senate. 
As a recommendation for improved presidential policy making, I thus argue that 
presidents should place a greater focus on their managerial strategies for developing and 
proposing their policy initiatives.  Rather than simply centralizing the process to lower 
front-end costs and then relying mostly strategies such as going public or legislative 
coalition building to pass their initiatives into law, presidents should instead put forth a 
greater effort at the development stage to prepare their initiatives in a manner that 
improves their substance and bureaucratic legitimacy.  More specifically, presidents 
must prepare their initiatives in a way that allows them to interact—through consultation 
and cooperation—with agency actors and legislators so that they can better gauge the 
political landscape and the obstacles it presents to successful policy passage.  In doing 
so, presidents should take advantage of the opportunity to revise and improve their 
   132    
 
 
initiatives in a manner that will help maximize their likelihood of success once they 
deliver their proposals to the Congress.  
Built on the findings of Chapters IV and V, which provided solid evidence that 
agency input aids presidential policy making in substantial ways, the interactive effects 
uncovered in this chapter provide further evidence of how strategic presidential 
management in policy development and policy leadership in the legislative arena 
influences the policy making process.  In addition, the findings also leave open the door 
to other questions regarding presidential-agency compatibility.  Specifically, although 
the analyses of this study have shown that agency input increases success and lowers the 
likelihood of changes to policy substance, it remains to be discussed how the level of 
compatibility influences the development of presidential policy proposals.  Specifically, 
scholars must also determine how presidential-agency compatibility can influence the 
presidential decisions on whether to employ agency input, the extent to which a 
president might compromise on certain policy preferences to gain agency support rather 
(than centralize the process to maximize personal preferences), and what role 
presidential-congressional compatibility and congressional-agency compatibility play in 
the process as well. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Sitting atop the executive branch as head of state, the president is poised to lead 
the country in every facet of governance.  This study has focused on the president’s role 
in leading the policy making process, both from within the executive branch and in the 
legislative arena.  As I stated at the beginning of this study, one of the major challenges 
presidents face in this task is in developing legislative policy proposals and then 
persuading members of Congress to pass them into law.  Because the Constitution 
bounds presidents to share their power with the legislative branch, presidents depend 
heavily on Congress to enact their policy goals.  Once presidents formally proposes their 
initiatives, they leave them at the hands of legislators who decide whether to consider 
them, alter their substance, and, depending on the overall level of opposition in 
legislative scrutiny, whether to pass them into law. 
Although scholars have gone to great lengths to examine the agenda setting stage 
(i.e. the policy proposal stage) and legislative outcomes, very little attention has been 
paid to the development stage of the policy making process.  More importantly, almost 
no attention has been given to consider how presidential management of the policy 
development stage influences presidential performance in the legislative arena.  As a 
result, scholars have overlooked a key piece of the puzzle that explains why, when, and 
how presidents are more likely to succeed in achieving their policy goals by passing 
their initiatives through the Congress. 
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Indeed, scholars have amassed a large volume of research that addresses the 
various environmental constraints presidents face in moving policy through Congress.  
Among other things, this research addresses the ideological and partisan barriers a 
president can face in trying to build a legislative coalition of support for a given policy, 
the influence that public opinion has on presidential and legislative behavior (and the 
sheer difficulty of trying to move opinion), structural factors regarding the bicameral 
structure of the legislative branch, and so on.  However, our knowledge of the 
president’s managerial role in policy development and its influence on legislative 
outcomes has garnered far less attention. 
As I explained at the outset of this study, within the rich descriptive literature on 
the managerial presidency there is some research on policy development and policy 
making, which argues generally that presidents should centralize the policy making 
process.  Led by Moe’s (1985) work, the underlying argument is that centralized policy 
development lowers managerial costs and relies on the input of president’s inner-circle 
of advisors who are capable of providing “responsive” competence.  However, more 
recent work demonstrates the drawbacks to such an approach, particularly in that it can 
increase overall transaction costs once the president formally proposes an initiative to 
Congress and thus decrease the likelihood of policy success.  This dissertation has 
challenged the mainstream assumption that centralized policy development is more 
advantageous for policy making success.  In doing so, I have demonstrated that greater 
efforts to develop policy initiatives with the more expert and objective advice of agency 
actors can have significant payoffs for presidential policy making performance. 
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My empirical analyses demonstrate that the use of agency input to develop 
presidential policy initiatives significantly increases the likelihood that presidents will 
succeed in passing their policy proposals into law and decreases the amount of changes 
to policy substance from the proposal stage to legislative passage.  I also find that more 
voluminous signaling with high levels of agency input presents a particularly potent, 
positive influence on presidential policy making success in Congress. 
The finding that increased agency input significantly increases legislative success 
and that increased agency input is particularly potent when presented in highly 
voluminous messages provides presidents with a new perspective of the policy making 
process and new incentives to consider in their policy making endeavors.  Thus, rather 
than focus primarily on their personal political preferences, presidents should prioritize 
their initiatives in a manner that first considers whether agency input can be 
implemented in a manner consistent with their general policy preferences. 
With regards to policy development, despite assertions in past research arguing 
that presidents should seek to centralize control of the policy development process (i.e., 
Moe 1985), the findings here indicate that presidents are more likely to achieve policy 
success in Congress by exerting more energy in developing policy initiatives for 
proposal to Congress.  Thus, regardless of the issue at hand, presidents are more likely to 
succeed by using a more mixed approach with agencies taking the lead because 
legislators are more likely to view any issue at that level as more bureaucratically 
legitimate and less political in nature.  More specifically, legislators—particularly 
partisan opponents of the president—are more likely to consider the passage of a 
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proposal seriously if they observe that the president has made a clear effort to 
incorporate the objectivity and expertise of agency actors and earn their support for 
implementation of said proposal. 
Concerning the interactive influence that occurs for level “4” initiatives proposed 
as highly voluminous messages, the findings confirm that presidents are particularly 
likely to maximize success by signaling to Congress that they have made a sincere effort 
to develop a legitimate policy solution and that such a solution is of the highest priority 
for the public agenda.  In contrast, although voluminous signaling of more centralized 
policy initiatives also confers to legislators that such initiatives are of the highest 
priority, the origin of such initiative as a product of inner-circle presidential advisors 
makes it unlikely that greater emphasis alone can convince partisan opponents that the 
initiative represents a legitimate policy prescription that rises above partisan politics.  
This is not to say that highly centralized and ideologically driven policy initiatives 
cannot represent legitimate solutions, but to emphasize that political opponents are more 
likely to view such initiatives through an ideological lens and therefore far less likely to 
see past any ideological differences to support such initiatives in a bipartisan manner.  
Instead, it is by earning the endorsement of agencies that presidents can create a 
perception of bureaucratic legitimacy, which signals to legislators that their actions 
represent a sincere effort towards effective policy making for serving the public good. 
Future Studies 
In this dissertation, I have taken some important steps in exploring the role and 
value of agency input in presidential policy development and its influence on 
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presidential policy making performance in the legislative arena.  My findings also leave 
open the door to researching other questions, primarily regarding (1) the influence of 
politicization on the value and potential of agency input, (2) the development of a more 
nuanced understanding of the networking and communications that occur between 
agency actors and the president, and (3) the incorporation and measurement of the 
concept of presidential-agency compatibility.  Accordingly, I will briefly outline my 
plans for addressing these nuances as part of my ongoing research agenda. 
The concept of politicization implies active presidential efforts to undermine the 
neutrality of agencies in favor of realigning their preferences – whether through redesign 
or repopulation – with the preferences of those at work in the Oval Office.  Beyond this 
general conceptual framework, there are several ways in which this vague premise can 
become practice, such as through the addition of political appointees on top of existing 
career civil service employees or the placement of loyal political appointees into 
important bureaucratic posts formerly held by career professionals (see Heclo 1975; 
Lewis 2005, 498).  It is important to take into account how politicization influences the 
relative objectivity and expertise of a given agency over time.  Specifically, I will 
continue working towards the development of a more nuanced measure of the 
president’s use of agency input that not only estimates the general involvement of an 
agency, but also controls for the extent to which an agency has been politicized.  By 
doing so, I will be better able to discern between symbolic versus tangible employment 
of objective and expert agency input. 
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My theoretical framework has emphasized that the difference in the level of 
objectivity and expertise between the president’s inner-circle advisors and that of agency 
actors is relative.  In particular, I have emphasized that although agency input is not 
absolute in its objectivity and expertise, it is nonetheless presumed to be relatively more 
so than the input of inner-circle advisors.  The findings on how agency input increases 
presidential policymaking success and decreases changes in policy substance indicate 
that, relatively speaking, a more objective and expert-based approach to policy 
development is more likely to aid the president’s policy making efforts.  Nevertheless, a 
more nuanced approach is necessary to better distinguish between symbolic and 
substantive measures of agency objectivity and expertise. 
Because politicization represents a deterioration of objectivity and expertise, 
legislators, particularly partisan opponents of the president, have reason to doubt the 
validity of input derived from a highly politicized agency.  Implicit in my theoretical 
framework and in the discussion of the findings is the notion that legislators can tell the 
difference between a partisan versus a more objective approach towards presidential 
policy making.  Accordingly, politicization is presumably one of the factors that may 
influence whether legislators view a given initiative as legitimate.  To this point, I have 
presumed that legislators can generally distinguish between genuine versus symbolic 
approaches to employing agency input and that symbolic approaches entailing 
politicized agency staff are less likely to succeed than the genuine, more objective input 
of dedicated career civil servants.  However, by incorporating more nuanced measures 
that take into account the influence of politicizat
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of when and under what conditions agency input is most effective in helping presidents 
move legislation through Congress. 
Another important step I can take to build on our understanding of presidential-
agency relations is to measure more precisely how, when, and to what extent presidents 
employ agency input.  As a way to build on the ordinal measure of centralization as 
employed in this study, I plan to delve more deeply into the legislative prehistory of 
presidential initiatives in order to collect information on the networking and 
communication that occurs between presidents, their inner-circle staff, and agency actors 
in the development of presidential initiatives.  In doing so, I will be able to better discern 
what kinds of interactions can best aid presidents in seeking out their policy agendas.  
Accordingly, I will explore how presidential-agency interactions may influence the 
manner that agency involvement translates into policy outcomes, and not only 
concerning success and changes in policy substance, but also with respect to policy 
implementation and its long-term effects. 
Last, I plan to explore how presidential-agency compatibility (i.e. the extent to 
which a president’s ideological beliefs and policy preferences concerning a given issue 
line up with those of a given agency) influences presidential management of the policy 
making process and its impact on presidential performance in the legislative arena.  
Specifically, I plan to explore how presidential-agency compatibility can influence 
presidential decisions on whether to employ agency input, the extent to which a 
president may compromise on certain policy preferences to gain agency support (rather 
than centralize the process to maximize personal preferences), and what role 
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presidential-congressional compatibility and congressional-agency compatibility play in 
the policy making process. 
Although the findings of my dissertation demonstrate that agency input increases 
success and lowers the likelihood of changes to policy substance, how the level of 
compatibility influences the development of presidential policy proposals remains an 
open question for scholars.  From the perspective of the Oval Office, presidents must 
make a difficult choice: are they better off trying to maximize their personal policy 
preferences or is it in their own best interests to seek the more objective and expert-
based opinion of agency civil servants?  In making such a decision, presidents should 
consider the overall level of compatibility between themselves, the agencies at hand, and 
Congress to decide the extent to which they can and are willing to employ agency input. 
Before exploring how presidents have dealt with compatibility in the past and 
prescribing how they might maximize policy making in the future, I must first tackle the 
challenge of coming up with reliable measures of agency preferences.  Thus far, scholars 
have employed only loose proxy dichotomous measures that capture party changes in the 
Congress and White House.  Although more recent studies have begun to develop 
ideological measures across agencies (see Clinton and Lewis 2008), such measures are 
still inherently subjective, do not cover all agencies, and do not vary overtime.  
Generally speaking, it may be necessary to develop a wide variety of measures and to 
test them thoroughly in order to develop a truly valid measure and operationalization of 
agency preferences that can accurately capture the dynamics and importance of 
compatibility in the presidential-agency relationship. 
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In all, this dissertation has provided new avenues for understanding presidential 
policy making.  Uniting research on presidential policy making with the knowledge and 
theories of bureaucratic policy making, this study introduced a theoretical framework for 
addressing the role and value of agency input in presidential legislative policy making.  
Given the strong evidence that agency input is a key ingredient to successful presidential 
policy making, I conclude that presidents can greatly benefit from employing a policy 
making strategy with agency input at its core.  I hope that this conclusion provides an 
impetus for scholars to reconsider conventional wisdom regarding presidential-
bureaucratic management and legislative policy making and also challenges them to 
build upon and expand our understanding of the president’s role in the policy making 
process. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A-1  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the Senate, 1949-2007 
(Logit Regression Models) 
 Success Model 1 
for the Senate 
Success Model 2 
for the Senate 
Success Model 3 
for the Senate 
 Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
.421*** 4.67 .422*** 4.72 .426*** 4.75 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.006** 1.65 .006** 1.68 .006** 1.74 
Issue Novelty 
 
.206 .78 .204 .78 .232 .88 
Issue Complexity 
 
.094 .62 .089 .59 .107 .70 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
.098 .71 .117 .85 .125 .90 
Reorganization 
Impact 
-.207 -.13 -.007 -.04 -.016 -.10 
Senate Cloture 
Pivot 
-7.86** -2.53 - - - - 
Divided 
Government 
- - -.613* -1.29 - - 
Percentage Seats 
in Senate 
- - - - .092** 2.32 
Presidential 
Approval 
.032** 2.55 .029** 2.30 .03** 2.41 
Change in 
Approval 
.021* 1.53 .017 1.23 .022* 1.59 
“First Mover” 
Chamber 
-.141 -.62 -.137 -.60 -.196 -.85 
Time in Term 
 
-.003 -.56 -.011** -1.97 -.006 -.88 
Deficit 
 
-.205 -.11 -1.09 -.60 -1.057 -.60 
N 466  466  466  
LR Chi² 95.47  90.39  94.10  
Prob>Chi² .0000  .0000  .0000  
Pseudo R² .1489  .1410  .1468  
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-2  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Policy Making Success in the 
Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 (Logit Predicted Probabilities) 
 Success Model 1 
for the Senate 
Success Model 2 
for the Senate 
Success Model 3 
for the Senate 
 Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
.3947 
(.1371) 
.3961 
(.1377) 
.3991 
(.1388) 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.3270 
(.0497) 
.3311 
(.0502) 
.3391 
(.0523) 
Senate Cloture Pivot -.7497 
(.2622) 
- - 
Divided Government - -.1491 
(.0745) 
- 
Percentage Seats in 
Senate 
- - .6361 
(.1833) 
Presidential Approval 
 
.4684 
(.1072) 
.4294 
(.0971) 
.4441 
(.1008) 
Change in Approval 
 
.3942 
(.0452) 
- .4152 
(.0480) 
Time in Term 
 
- -.2698 
(.0758) 
- 
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Results shown only for coefficients with significant findings 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-3  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Success in the House, 1949-2007 
(Logit Regression Models) 
 Success Model 1 
for the House 
Success Model 2 
for the House 
Success Model 3 
for the House 
 Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
.427*** 4.73 .431*** 4.80 .436*** 4.81 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.007** 1.86 .006** 1.74 .007** 1.88 
Issue Novelty 
 
.206 .78 .204 .78 .215 .81 
Issue Complexity 
 
.076 .51 .081 .54 .088 .58 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
.172** 1.70 .188** 1.88 .182** 1.80 
Reorganization 
Impact 
-.04 -.25 -.016 -.10 -.048 -.30 
House Median 
Pivot 
-.651* -1.36 - - - - 
Divided 
Government 
- - -6.56*** -2.55 - - 
Percentage Seats 
in House 
- - - - .109*** 2.80 
Presidential 
Approval 
.033*** 2.61 .03*** 2.36 .028*** 2.29 
Change in 
Approval 
.026** 1.80 .017 1.26 .024** 1.73 
“First Mover” 
Chamber 
.147 .64 .12 .53 .171 .74 
Time in Term 
 
-.005 -.83 -.01** -1.75 -.003 -.54 
Deficit 
 
-1.549 -.88 -.953 -.52 -2.036 -1.15 
N 466  466  466  
LR Chi² 98.63  93.45  99.66  
Prob>Chi² .0000  .0000  .0000  
Pseudo R² .1539  .1458  .1555  
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
 
   156    
 
 
 
Table A-4  Agency Input Influence on Presidential Policy Making Success in the 
House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 (Logit Predicted Probabilities) 
 Success Model 1 
for the House 
Success Model 2 
for the House 
Success Model 3 
for the House 
 Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
.3995 
(.1390) 
.4033 
(.1405) 
.4071 
(.1419) 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.3522 
(.0555) 
.3404 
(.0523) 
.3534 
(.0558) 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
.3516 
(.0502) 
.3778 
(.0552) 
.3660 
(.0531) 
House Median Pivot 
 
-.7317 
(.2737) 
- - 
Divided Government 
 
- -.1579 
(.0790) 
- 
Percentage Seats in 
House 
- - .7290 
(.2306) 
Presidential Approval 
 
.4766 
(.1094) 
.4409 
(.1000) 
.4182 
(.0942) 
Change in Approval 
 
.4665 
(.0551) 
.3330 
(.0374) 
..4431 
(.0518) 
Time in Term 
 
- -.2417 
(.0676) 
- 
Dependent Variable: 1 = Success, 0 = No Success 
Note: Results shown only for coefficients with significant findings 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-5  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in 
the Senate, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success Model 1 
for the Senate 
Success Model 2 
for the Senate 
Success Model 3 
for the Senate 
 Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
-.407*** -4.55 -.439*** -4.99 -.433*** -4.94 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.002 .60 .002 .66 .002 .70 
Issue Novelty 
 
.054 .23 -.032 -.14 -.011 -.05 
Issue Complexity 
 
.518*** 3.35 .527*** 3.41 .527*** 3.42 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
-.119 -.91 -.151 -1.16 -.15 -1.15 
Reorganization 
Impact 
-.259 -1.61 -.256 -1.59 -.282* -1.77 
Senate Cloture 
Pivot 
1.782** 2.10 - - - - 
Divided 
Government 
- - .475** 2.03 - - 
Percentage Seats 
in Senate 
- - - - -.023** -1.70 
Presidential 
Approval 
-.01 -1.14 -.017* -1.75 -.012 -1.33 
Change in 
Approval 
-.015 -1.13 -.019 -1.42 -.017 -1.24 
“First Mover” 
Chamber 
.554** 2.26 .621*** 2.54 .65*** 2.64 
Time in Term 
 
.01** 2.03 .008 1.61 .009* 1.77 
Deficit 
 
-.205 -.15 -.551 -.41 -.993 -.75 
N 466  466  466  
LR Chi² 63.75  63.47  62.26  
Prob>Chi² .0000  .0000  .0000  
Pseudo R² .1086  .1081  .1061  
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-6  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in 
the Senate, 1949-2007 (Predicted Probability Scores) 
 (Logit Predicted Probabilities) 
 Success Model 1 
for the Senate 
Success Model 2 
for the Senate 
Success Model 3 
for the Senate 
 Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
-.3267 
(.1137) 
-.3503 
(.1226) 
-.3461 
(.1210) 
Issue Complexity 
 
.2177 
(.0836) 
.2211 
(.0849) 
.2214 
(.0850) 
Senate Cloture Pivot 
 
.2292 
(.0521) 
- - 
Divided Government 
 
- .1011 
(.0493) 
- 
Percentage Seats in 
Senate 
- - -.1645 
(.0407) 
Presidential Approval 
 
- -.2233 
(.0482) 
- 
“First Mover” 
Chamber 
.1114 
(.0540) 
.1238 
(.0603) 
.1294 
(.0632) 
Time in Term 
 
.1938 
(.0564) 
- .1725 
(.0498) 
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Results shown only for coefficients with significant findings 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-7  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in 
the House, 1949-2007 (Logit Regression Models) 
 Success Model 1 
for the House 
Success Model 2 
for the House 
Success Model 3 
for the House 
 Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score Coefficients Z-Score 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
-.405*** -4.12 -.416*** -4.24 -.414*** -4.21 
Presidential 
Signaling 
.005 1.15 .005 1.31 .005 1.15 
Issue Novelty 
 
-.059 -.22 -.062 -.23 -.06 -.22 
Issue Complexity 
 
.718*** 4.37 .708*** 4.32 .707*** 4.31 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
-.112 -1.17 -.132* -1.41 -.123* -1.31 
Reorganization 
Impact 
-.234* -1.39 -.240* -1.42 -.227* -1.35 
House Median 
Pivot 
5.385** 2.20 - - - - 
Divided 
Government 
- - .657* 1.33 - - 
Percentage Seats 
in House 
- - - - -.093** -2.36 
Presidential 
Approval 
-.033** -2.50 -.031*** -2.32 -.029** -2.26 
Change in 
Approval 
-.029** -1.86 .022* -1.50 -.027** -1.81 
“First Mover” 
Chamber 
.116 .47 .122 .50 .091 .37 
Time in Term 
 
-.004 -.63 -.00008 -.01 -.006 -.83 
Deficit 
 
2.559 1.31 1.955 .98 3.108* 1.57 
N 466  466  466  
LR Chi² 74.88  71.76  75.62  
Prob>Chi² .0000  .0000  .0000  
Pseudo R² .1311  .1256  .1323  
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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Table A-8  Agency Input Influence on Changes in Presidential Policy Substance in 
the House, 1949-2007 (Predicted Probability Scores) 
 (Logit Predicted Probabilities) 
 Success Model 1 
for the House 
Success Model 2 
for the House 
Success Model 3 
for the House 
 Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Min->Max 
(-+sd/2) 
Agency Input 
(Decentralization) 
-.3075 
(.1066) 
-.3157 
(.1096) 
-.3137 
(.1089) 
Issue Complexity 
 
.2837 
(.1089) 
.2804 
(.1076) 
.2795 
(.1072) 
Crosscutting 
Jurisdictions 
- -.3006 
(.0312) 
-.2790 
(.0291) 
Reorganization  
Impact 
-.0985 
(.0320) 
-.1011 
(.0329) 
-.0955 
(.0311) 
House Median Pivot 
 
.5983 
(.1844) 
- - 
Divided Government 
 
- .1330 
(.0644) 
- 
Percentage Seats in 
House 
- - -.6088 
(.1607) 
Presidential Approval 
 
-.3993 
(.0885) 
-.3776 
(.0833) 
-.3548 
(.0779) 
Change in Approval 
 
-.4673 
(.0488) 
-.3706 
(.0383) 
-.4504 
(.0469) 
Deficit 
 
- - .2324 
(.0566) 
Dependent Variable: 0 = no change in policy substance, 1 = < 50% change, 2 = > 50% 
change, and 3 = mostly changed or failure 
Note: Presidential style administrative dummy variables also used but not shown above 
Results are for one and two-tailed tests, where p<0.1*, p<0.05**, p<0.01*** 
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